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ABSTRACT
As the fastest-growing urban area in the United States—and due to
its emerging national influence in commercial real estate development and
leasing through transformational transactions such as Amazon’s recently
completed national HQ2 search—the City of Seattle and related
Washington State laws addressing the use of dual agency in commercial
transactions present a unique backdrop for examining the findings and
recommendations from a 2014 commercial real estate conflicts of interest
research study and attendant report, described below, more than four years
after its publication.
In November 2014, a published research study report made a number
of key observations about the existence of adverse legal and transactional
consequences from conflicts of interest in the representation of
commercial tenants by full-service brokerage firms engaged in the
commercial real estate services (CRES) sector actively engaged in the
practice of “dual agency.” That report, published by the Center for Real
Estate and Urban Analysis (CREUA) at The George Washington
University School of Business in Washington, D.C., also offered a series
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of key recommendations for mitigating or eliminating entirely these
adverse consequences.1
In the intervening years since the mid-November 2014 publication
of the conflicts of interest research report, the CRES sector has not taken
any steps, in the form of industry self-regulation or otherwise, to address—
much less ameliorate—these legal issues and the attendant, adverse
transactional consequences for commercial tenants. Further, over the same
period, (1) there has been increasing consolidation among the five largest
CRES full-service brokerage firms (i.e., collectively they represent a
larger share of the market for leasing commercial property than in 2014,
when the CREUA conflicts of interest research report was conducted); and
(2) those firms have gained traction in numerous domestic commercial
property markets by taking equity positions in a substantial amount of
commercial space available for lease in major markets.2
These market developments further exacerbate the negative
consequences for tenants seeking independent, objective, and professional
representation in commercial real estate transactions because they present
the prospect that, in a dual agency scenario, the tenant representative may
be acting as an undisclosed principal.3 And even in cases where the tenant
representative discloses the existence of a conflict where their firm is a
principal in the transaction, the tenant may not be adequately equipped
with the knowledge necessary to understand the significance and
consequence of the self-dealing present in this transaction.
As a consequence, the problems associated with dual agency have
become more acute and more pervasive in the world of commercial real
estate generally, and in commercial leasing transactions in particular.
Under the common law, an agent would owe the following duties to its
principal:
 Unbroken service and loyalty (the “duty of undivided loyalty”);
 Confidentiality;
 Full disclosure of information necessary for the principal for to
make well-informed decisions;
 Acting in the best interest of the principal;
 Reasonable care and diligence; and

1. PETER E. SMIRNIOTOPOULOS, CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE AND URBAN ANALYSIS, CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST IN COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: WHO REPRESENTS THE TENANT (2014)
[hereinafter SMIRNIOTOPOULOS, 2014 COI STUDY REPORT] (on file with Seattle University Law
Review). For a summary of relevant sections of the report, see infra Part I.
2. See infra Part IV.
3. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.
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Accountability to the principal.

However, in Washington State, the legislature in 1996 replaced the
common law duties agents owe to principals under state common law—
such as the duty of undivided loyalty—with a statutory scheme that, at
best, causes confusion about the duties an agent owes its principal,4
particularly in the context of a dual agency representation of the tenant and
the landlord in the same transaction.
INTRODUCTION
A prospective tenant seeking to lease commercial space, commonly
referred to in commercial leasing as the “Premises”—or even a tenant
seeking to renew a commercial lease agreement for the tenant’s existing
Premises—only knows what it knows about the commercial real estate
market at any given point in time. With the exception of tenants in the
business of providing commercial real estate services to others, even
tenants engaged in the business of real estate generally, or commercial real
estate specifically, will have their financial and legal interests well-served
by seeking out professional representation from a commercial real estate
broker. However, for this to be true, that professional representation must
come with the representative’s commitment to a duty of undivided loyalty
to the tenant. Commercial real estate brokers “represent” a commercial
tenant’s interests by leading the process of searching for and selecting new
premises and negotiating the best deal possible while the prospective
tenant relies upon the broker’s specialized industry knowledge and
professional integrity.
Commercial leases are legal contracts documenting the conclusion
of inherently complex transactions, involving dozens and dozens of
moving parts or “deal points.” Each aspect of this transaction must be
meticulously researched in the market or submarket in which the
commercial tenant seeks to become or remain located. These deal points
inevitably become the subject of often intense negotiations with one or
more prospective landlords. Ultimately, the deal points to which both
landlord and tenant agree, assuming they are able to do so with the skilled
representation of their respective agents, will form the basis for a complex
and often very lengthy commercial contract, most-frequently titled “Lease
Agreement” or “Agreement of Lease.” This legal contract commonly runs
between forty and sixty pages, not including referenced attachments. It is
within this context that small and large business enterprises require the
4. See infra Part II (discussing the statutory scheme and identifying the difficulties of taking no
action adverse to a principal when an agent is acting as a dual agent).
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objective, independent, and professional assistance of a commercial real
estate broker to represent the best interests of their business.
Prospective tenants often assume and expect that licensing
requirements and other government regulations compel, or at least require,
providers of professional commercial real estate services to represent them
in a manner serving the tenant’s best interests at all times.
The search for new premises and the resultant leasing contract often
represent an enterprise’s first or second largest annual operating expense5
and entail contractual commitments of anywhere between five and twenty
years, sometimes even longer but rarely shorter.
Given the complexity of this process and the contractual
commitments to which the “successful” prospective tenant will be
subjected, it is difficult to construct a scenario under which the best
interests of the tenant will be well-served by an agent or broker that also
represents the landlord in the same transaction. These parties could not be
more adverse: the landlord wants to command the highest possible rent for
the longest period of time (i.e., the “Lease Term”) with the fewest
substantive obligations being owed to the tenant; the tenant, for its part,
wants to secure the most competitive (i.e., least expensive) aggregate
annual rental cost, the greatest amount of flexibility in terms of the tenant’s
ongoing commitment to pay that annual rental cost, and beyond that, wants
to be left alone to conduct its business. How could the same commercial
broker ever reconcile such diametrically opposed forces when presuming
to represent both parties at the same time in a dual agency scenario? In the
context of legal representation, this is what is known as an unwaivable
conflict of interest; no amount of advance, written disclosure will “cure”
the inherent conflict.
Many commercial tenants in Greater Seattle, given the ethnic, socioeconomic, and cultural diversity of the area’s business community and the
plethora of small businesses that give the city its unique character, lack the
economic bargaining power, the commercial business sophistication and
acumen, and the financial wherewithal to adequately represent their
business interests without expert, independent, and objective
representation. Without this expert representation, these tenants may be
unable to avoid dire, often personal, financial consequences, including
possible personal bankruptcy, due to lease guarantees for their businesses,
5. Although a business sector’s percentage of total operating expenses devoted to real estate (i.e.,
facilities costs) will vary from sector-to-sector: compare, for example, a facilities-intensive, highly
automated manufacturing business, on the one hand, with a place-based, human-labor-intensive
business, such as a professional services firm with a physical presence or a commercial office in a
central business district. Generally speaking, personnel or human capital costs and facilities costs will
generally occupy the highest and second-highest percentage of a business’s total operating costs.
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as a result of having entered into a bad lease. As the city of Seattle and
surrounding areas experience more acute pressures to grow and expand,
the potential for the “retail gentrification” of the city’s most diverse and
economically-challenged commercial corridors and districts will increase
accordingly. This increasing pressure results in adverse economic
consequences on small businesses and their individual owners from
landlords’ strict enforcement of the terms of leases in buildings determined
by the landlord to have a more profitable use than leasing to the current
tenant. Such an increasing pressure may cause an epidemic of small
business failures.
Taking into account the inherent asymmetry of both qualitative and
quantitative information in the commercial real estate marketplace—as
contrasted with the residential sales market, where everyone has access to
the same information—the importance of objective and independent
representation of tenants cannot be overstated. As posited, in pertinent
part, in the 2014 Conflicts of Interest Research Report:
Regrettably, the nature of the commercial market for leased
properties, as well as the process through which commercial tenants
make their leasing decisions, is more like McMillan’s descriptions of
transactions taking place in the bazaars of Marrakesh or Yemen and
less like U.S. capital markets or the residential real estate market.6

Additionally, inasmuch as full-service CRES firms annually receive
the lion’s share of their brokerage fees from landlords, it is perhaps
quixotic to believe that, in a dual agency scenario, these dual agent brokers
will do anything contrary to the best interests of their landlord clients. This
may be true even if serving the best interests of the landlords means not
serving the best interests of a firm’s tenant clients as a consequence,
because of the risk that landlord clients may complain that the brokerage
firm is biting the hand that feeds them and immediately terminate the
professional relationship for that reason.
Washington’s Real Estate Brokerage Relationships statute7 provides
a statutory licensing scheme that, by intention, completely supplants the
traditional, and substantial, fiduciary duties a commercial real estate agent
would otherwise owe to its principal at common law.8 The statute
supersedes the common law of agency in a manner and under a regime in
which an agent’s duties to a tenant might arguably be reduced to that of a
mere matchmaker, when in fact commercial practice and a prospective
tenant’s reasonable expectations is that a commercial broker would serve
6. SMIRNIOTOPOULOS, 2014 COI STUDY REPORT, supra note 1, at 69.
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.86 (2018).
8. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.86.110 (2018).
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a much larger role than a mere matchmaker. The statute is, in fact, a very
poor substitute for the common law duties an agent owes its principal and
appears counterintuitive, if not completely antithetical, to Washington’s
otherwise robust consumer protections.9 And it does little, if anything, to
specifically protect the best interests of a prospective tenant.
Accordingly, without doing violence to the other provisions of
Revised Code of Washington section 18.86, the statute should be amended
to impose an absolute ban on commercial dual agency. Further, in the
context of commercial real estate, all duties that an agent would owe to a
principal under common law should be reinstated to restore the full
protections a principal is afforded under the common law of agency. There
can be no middle ground. Advance written notice and a written waiver of
the inherent conflicts of interest does nothing to address, much less
ameliorate, those stark conflicts.
Part I will provide a summary of the relevant portions of the 2014
Conflicts of Interest Report and provide some information regarding the
Greater Seattle Area commercial real estate market.10 Part II will provide
an overview of the common law of agency as it relates to real estate agents
or brokers, and analysis of the legislative history of Washington’s statutory
codification of broker agency duties under Revised Code of
Washington section 18.86. Part III will examine common law as it was
applied in Washington, provide a discussion of relevant case law, and
discuss various conflicts of interests that are prohibited under Revised
Code of Washington section 18.86 and the potential remedies for
violations of those prohibitions. Finally, Part IV will examine the
emergence of brokers being principals or fiduciary managers for properties
they broker, discuss the legal implications of a broker being an undisclosed
principal in a transaction they broker after Revised Code of Washington
section 18.86 and discuss the importance of reinstating common law
fiduciary duties in commercial real estate transactions.

9. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (2018) (declaring unlawful a broad range of “unfair”
behavior including unfair competition, unfair business acts or practices, and deceptive acts or
practices); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.030 (2018) (declaring contracts or conspiracies in the restraint
of trade to be unlawful); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.040 (2018) (declaring monopolies unlawful);
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.050 (2018) (declaring certain agreements unlawful when competition is
lessened as a result); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.060 (2018) (declaring acquisition of stock by a
corporation unlawful when it lessens competition); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (2018) (creating a
private right of action for parties injured by unlawful behavior under the statute and providing for
attorney fees and treble damages for parties prevailing under Washington’s Consumer Protection Act).
10. For a much more thorough and in-depth look at the conflicts of interest present in the CRES
sector, see SMIRNIOTOPOULOS, 2014 COI STUDY REPORT, supra note 1.
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PART I
As stated above, Part I of this Article provides an overview of the
context within which the legal research, analysis, and arguments are
presented, including a brief of the Greater Seattle Area commercial real
estate market, within which the regulatory obligations of the CRES sector
participants are tested on a daily basis.
A. The 2014 Conflicts of Interest Research Report
The 2014 research study conducted by the Center for Real Estate and
Urban Analysis at The George Washington University School of Business
in Washington, D.C., leading to the publication in November 2014 of a
comprehensive research study report,11 serves as the springboard for this
Article. The purpose of the 2014 Conflicts of Interest Research Report was
as follows:
[To] identify the potential conflicts of interest inherent in real estate
transactions between a commercial tenant and a prospective landlord;
evaluate the legal, regulatory, and industry mechanisms in place to
protect the interests of commercial tenants through professional
representation in these transactions; and where necessary, make
recommendations for how such tenant protections might be
strengthened to assure an arm’s length transaction between the
parties, thereby optimizing the functioning of the commercial real
estate marketplace.12

The study made a number of key findings. First, the study found that,
unlike other U.S. markets, the U.S. commercial leasing market lacks
transparency and equal access to information for all parties.13 This is due
to the commercial leasing market being characterized by information
asymmetry with data regarding market characteristics being almost
exclusively idiosyncratic to specific CRES firms and the fact that there is
no centralized or industry standard for tracking and reporting critical
market data.14
Second, the study found that, to the extent that any unifying influence
exists over the commercial leasing market, such influence favors
landlords, with the market being driven by the supply of available
premises for lease, not by the demand for premises.15 The CRES sector is
loosely organized such that issues relating to conflicts of interests have not
been addressed in any systematic way benefiting tenants, with licensure
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2.
13. Id. at 8.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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requirements varying from state to state. Further, the CRES industry has
openly opposed legislative and regulatory reform efforts seeking to
improve the quality of representation provided to tenants through
mandatory disclosure of conflicts of interest in dual agency situations.
Such public opposition has created at least the appearance that full-service
CRES firms dominate the CRES sector and that they would prefer not to
have to make such disclosures before representing a tenant, despite
countervailing, common law duties requiring full disclosure of such
conflicts.
These relationships between and among various principals in a real
estate development or acquisition transaction, or in the course of the
normal ownership and management of commercial property—developers,
institutional and other equity investors, and lenders of various types—are
increasingly complex yet obscured from the public. The roles CRES firms
play in providing services have become increasingly complex and
convoluted, to the point that it may be unrealistic to expect the average
office tenant to understand the full impact of dual agency or consenting to
other conflicts of interest.
Finally, the study found that the fundamental relationship between
landlords and tenants is inherently adversarial, both in the negotiation and
execution of lease agreements and in the tenant’s occupancy of the
landlord’s premises. The parties’ respective interests are so inherently
adverse that the conflict cannot be adequately remedied by the fully
informed consent of both parties.16
This final finding raises a fundamental question for the profession: If
legal ethics prohibit an attorney or a law firm from representing both the
landlord and a tenant in the negotiations of a lease agreement or in a
dispute over the interpretation of the terms and conditions in a lease
agreement, how can the divergent interests of those same parties
nonetheless be adequately represented by the same CRES firm through
dual agency?17
The study also made a number of key recommendations.18 The study
recommended further research into the practices among full-service CRES
firms as to the incidence and intensity of actual conflicts of interest in the
CRES Sector,19 analysis of conflicts of interests policies, procedures,
practices, and possible best practices among full-service CRES firms, and
16. Id.
17. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (prohibiting
representation of multiple current clients when the clients’ interests are directly adverse to each other).
18. SMIRNIOTOPOULOS, 2014 COI STUDY REPORT, supra note 1, at 10–11.
19. See id. at Appendix B: Conflicts of Interest survey instrument, Appendix C: Conflicts of
Interest survey results.
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research into tenants’ depth of understanding about the types and
significance of various conflicts that may and do occur within the
commercial leasing marketplace. The report also recommended that the
CRES sector become more and better organized, potentially modeling the
National Association of Realtors. Finally, the study recommended a
Model Code of Conduct be established for CRES firms.20
The report contained a primer on the CRES sector, including the
identification of likely parties to commercial real estate transactions and
the types of transactions in which they are typically engaged21 and
specifically addressed the increasingly important and diverse roles played
by full-service brokerage firms in those transactions and the trend toward
consolidation of market share among the largest full-service commercial
real estate brokers.22 Increasing consolidation that has taken place in the
last few decades within the CRES sector;23 as a result, it is perhaps easy to
understand how the incidence of conflicts of interest in commercial leasing
transactions may be on the rise.24 The report detailed how, in the span of
six years (from 2008 to 2013), three large tenant-only CRES firms—Julian
Studley, The Staubach Companies, and Newmark Real Estate Company,
Inc.—were acquired by much larger, global, full-service CRES firms,
removing a substantial amount of tenant-only representation from the
CRES sector in the United States, by making formerly tenant-only agents
employees of full-service CRES firms.25
The report identified a number of situations that, although they may
not give rise to legal claims, present significant conflicts of interests in the
CRES sector.26 The following scenarios could arise where the Leasing
Transaction is closed by a listing broker and tenant agent employed by the
same full-service CRES firm:

20. Id. at 10–11.
21. Id. at 17–19 (Section III(B), The Role of the CRES Sector in Commercial Real Estate
Transactions).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 18–19; see also id. at Appendix D: Profiles of the Largest Full-Service and TenantOnly CRES Firms.
24. Id. at 19–22 (expanding on the reasons for why the incidents of conflicts of interest may be
on the rise).
25. Id. at 71–78. This trend towards full-service CRES firms acquiring tenant-only firms has
continued, with CBRE acquiring Global Workplace Solutions in 2015, JLL acquiring Nextpart in
2015, JLL acquiring Cresa South Florida in 2015, JLL acquiring Washington Partners in 2016, Colliers
International acquiring Serten Advisors in 2017, and Newmark Knight Frank acquiring Jackson
Cooksey in 2018; see id. at Appendix D: Profiles of the Largest Full-Service and Tenant-Only CRES
Firms.
26. Id. at 19.
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The Listing Broker manipulates or otherwise influences the
commission on the transaction to be paid to the Tenant’s Agent
to get the lease closed.

b. Without manipulating or otherwise influencing the amount and
payment of the Agent’s commission, the Listing Broker offers
incentives outside the commission structure but within the
control of the CRES firm, including but not limited to promised
increases in base salary, benefits, or future advancement within
the firm.
c.

Without manipulating or otherwise influencing the amount and
payment of the Agent’s commission or otherwise creating
specific incentives within the CRES Firm’s ordinary
compensation structure, the Developer or Property Owner
promises the Listing Broker additional property listings if the
Subject Property is fully tenanted within a specified time frame,
and the Tenant Agent is promised specific opportunities,
remuneration, or both if such additional property listings are
awarded to the Listing Broker by the Developer or Property
Owner.

d. The Tenant Agent shares with the Listing Broker confidential
information about the prospective Tenant that is not generally
publicly available and which the prospective Tenant has shared
with the Tenant Agent in confidence,27 such as (a) the
prospective Tenant’s current financial condition; (b) changes in
the Tenant’s business or market position that could impact the
prospective Tenant’s future operating income and, consequently,
its ability to pay rent or other obligations; (c) potential changes
in the Tenant’s business or industry sector; and (d) the
prospective Tenant’s simultaneous negotiation of one or more
comparable commercial leases as a hedge against not being able
to secure from the Listing Broker the terms and conditions the
prospective Tenant requires or prefers regarding the Premises.28

The report provides an explanation on how U.S. commercial leasing
operates as a marketplace.29 Two market concepts must be understood to
fully comprehend how markets function: the “workable market platform”
component and the concept of “market efficiency.”30
27. See, e.g., Advisory and Transaction Services, CBRE, https://www.cbre.com/real-estateservices/investor/advisory-and-transaction-services [https://perma.cc/8NPR-5FZD] (CBRE, a fullservice firm that represents tenants as well as landlords, boasting of its “leading-edge” services,
including being able to offer investors “[p]rospective tenant profiles and strategies”).
28. SMIRNIOTOPOULOS, 2014 COI STUDY REPORT, supra note 1, at 19–20.
29. Id. at 64–71 (Part V).
30. Id. at 65–66.
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The workable market platform has five essential elements, including
that (1) information flows smoothly, (2) property rights are appropriately
protected, (3) people can be trusted to honor their promises, (4)
externalities are minimized, and (5) competition is fostered.31
As to the concept of market efficiency, the Efficient Market Theory
posits that an “informationally efficient” market will always arrive at the
correct price.32 At issue in Eugene Fama’s work is whether markets
operate rationally, such that in the face of perfect information prices reflect
all such information, or are they also susceptible to other forces, such as
investors’ hopes and fears?
When markets are inefficient, the party in possession of and
controlling the flow of information gains a superior bargaining position.
Among other disadvantages to tenants caused by asymmetrical
information in the U.S. commercial leasing market is the lack of a
comprehensive understanding of what all relatively comparable options
might be at any given point in time without exclusive reliance on the tenant
agent.
The report also examined the Commercial Real Estate Services
sector in the United States.33 The report found that over the past nine years
(preceding the publication of the Conflicts of Interest Research Study
Report in November 2014), CRES firms have grown in size, geographic
reach, breadth of services offered, and overall importance to and
involvement in various aspects of the development and financing of
commercial properties, both domestically and internationally. They have
become increasingly global, and the more landlord-focused CRES firms
have expanded their tenant representation capabilities primarily by
acquiring U.S. national, regional, or local tenant-only brokerages. Local
firms become or are swallowed-up by regional or national firms, while
national firms have become or are swallowed-up by international firms. In
2013, the five largest, full-service CRES firms were involved in 150,461
commercial property transactions generating over one-half of $1 billion in
commercial property transaction revenues ($553.3 million in the
aggregate).34 The five largest, full-service CRES firms also generated over
$16 billion in aggregate, total revenues in 2013.35 There is a substantial
31. Id. (citing JOHN MCMILLAN, REINVENTING THE BAZAAR: A NATURAL HISTORY OF
MARKETS (2002)).
32. John H. Cochrane, Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Markets, and the Nobel Prize, CHI. BOOTH
REV. (May 20, 2014), https://review.chicagobooth.edu/magazine/winter-2013/eugene-fama-efficientmarkets-and-the-nobel-prize [https://perma.cc/XB65-QJ8Y].
33. JOHN MCMILLAN, REINVENTING THE BAZAAR: A NATURAL HISTORY OF MARKETS 71–77
(2002).
34. SMIRNIOTOPOULOS, 2014 COI STUDY REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
35. Id.
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disparity between the size and scale of the five largest full-service CRES
firms and the five largest full-service CRES firms operating in the United
States in 2013.36
B. Deal Points
In the negotiations between landlords and tenants in a commercial
real estate context, a number of deal points exist that serve to shape the
final lease conditions, including obligations on the part of each party. Real
Estate Law: Fundamentals for The Development Process offers a
thorough analysis of these deal points, devoting fifty pages to legal issues
in property management and leasing of commercial properties.37 A brief
excerpt is included below to provide greater understanding as to the
inherently adversarial nature of landlord and tenant negotiations and the
inherent complexity of commercial leasing transactions:
While real estate lawyers go to great lengths to make sure real estate
contract documents such as commercial lease agreements address all
likely scenarios and eventualities, and are compensated handsomely
to do so, inevitably reasonable parties – much less unreasonable
parties – are going to have disagreements in interpreting their rights,
duties, and mutual responsibilities under such documents.38

Professor Poorvu, in his chapter in The Real Estate Game on
“Operations,” offers the following listing of commercial lease agreement
sections or major clauses as his framework to understanding Property
Management:


The parties;



Eminent domain;



The commencement date;



Default by tenant;



Building and premises;



Default by landlord;



Use of the premises;



Security deposit;



Term: original and extended;

36. JOHN MCMILLAN, REINVENTING THE BAZAAR: A NATURAL HISTORY OF MARKETS 72
(2002).
37. PETER E. SMIRNIOTOPOULOS, REAL ESTATE LAW: FUNDAMENTALS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS 399–449 (2016).
38. Id.
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Subordination, estoppel certificates and nondisturbance;



Base and additional rent;



Subletting and assignment;



Tenant’s obligations;



Consents;



Landlord’s obligations;



Condition of premises;



Compliance with laws;



Tenant improvements;



Environment;



Landlord’s work;



Insurance Broker;



Parking;



Damage to premises; and



Miscellaneous.39
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Depending upon the prospective tenant, its business priorities and
needs, the condition and location of the prospective Premises, and the peripatetic nature of the plethora of Greater Seattle Area’s commercial corridors, districts, shopping centers, and stand-alone and pad-site buildings,
any one or more of the commercial lease provisions excerpted above, more
than merely a handful of these issues could prove problematic in the selection of Premises and arms-length, third-party negotiation of a Lease
Agreement to that prospective tenant. Chapter Eleven of Real Estate Law:
Fundamentals of The Development Process covers each of the typical
lease provisions outlined by Professor Poorvu and excerpted above, delves
into specific detail for each of these lease provisions, and also adds a few
Professor Poorvu did not include in The Real Estate Game.40 Given the
myriad potential permutations of this list, and considering further that a
potential tenant’s list of priorities for and sensitivities to these deal points
may diverge dramatically from those of the prospective landlord, it is easy
to understand the inherent complexities of, and lease issues as to, which
the tenant’s and the landlord’s interests will be at odds, in a commercial
leasing transaction.
39. Id. at 406 (citing WILLIAM POORVU & JEFFREY L. CRUIKSHANK, THE REAL ESTATE GAME:
THE INTELLIGENT GUIDE TO DECISION-MAKING AND INVESTMENT 191 (1999)).
40. Id. at 405–19.
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C. The Greater Seattle Commercial Real Estate Market in 2018
Included within the context provided above is a snapshot of the
Greater Seattle Area commercial real estate market, within which the
regulatory obligations of the CRES sector participants are tested, on a
daily basis, in terms of brokers’ and agents’ compliance, in their day-today dealings with their clients, under Revised Code of Washington
section 18.86. In an over-heated commercial real estate market, the
professionalism and ethical performance of commercial real estate brokers
and agents, whose earnings are determined by the volume and monetary
sizes of their annual transactions, is continually tested. As the following
statistics reveal, in this regard the Greater Seattle commercial real estate
market may serve as an excellent barometer for how the foundations of the
law of principal and agent are being honored, or abused, under the far less
rigorous statutory regime under Revised Code of Washington
section 18.86.
The Greater Seattle Area has experienced tremendous growth over
the recent years; however, this growth in Seattle has slowed recently.41
And despite fears of a looming recession, Seattle remains an attractive
choice for investors.42 This level of growth comes at a cost, with increases
to the cost of living, exacerbation of wealth inequalities, and additional
pressure on the infrastructure.43 It is no surprise then that many cities are
actively trying to avoid “Seattle-ization.”44 The area is home to an
estimated 3.8 million people, by a 2017 estimate, with further population
growth expected and having already occurred.45 The labor market has seen
some slowing, but is still strong with unemployment at 4.1% in March

41. Compare PWC & URB. LAND INST., EMERGING TRENDS IN REAL ESTATE: UNITED STATES
CANADA 2019 (2019), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/asset-management/real-estate/assets
/pwc-emerging-trends-in-real-estate-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7AJ-TY3N] (ranking Seattle 16th in
overall real estate prospects), with Mike Wheatly, PwC Names Seattle as Top Real Estate Market in
the U.S., REALTY BIZ NEWS (Oct. 27, 2017), https://realtybiznews.com/pwc-names-seattle-as-topreal-estate-market-in-the-u-s/98745046/ [https://perma.cc/K8YT-VX88], and Gene Balk, Census:
Seattle is the Fastest-Growing Big City in the U.S., SEATTLE TIMES (May 22, 2014), http://blogs.
seattletimes.com/fyi-guy/2014/05/22/census-seattle-is-the-fastest-growing-big-city-in-the-u-s/ [https:
//perma.cc/UAG8-RNUK].
42. KIDDER MATHEWS, SEATTLE OFFICE: REAL ESTATE MARKET REVIEW 1ST QUARTER 2019
(2019) [hereinafter KIDDER Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT], http://www.kiddermathews.com/
downloads/research/office-market-research-seattle-2019-1q.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JMS-JYAZ].
43. Gene Balk, ‘Seattle-ization’? American Cities Fear What’s Happened Here, SEATTLE TIMES
(Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/data/seattle-ization-american-cities-fearwhats-happened-here/ [https://perma.cc/P4WG-E6UR].
44. Id.
45. U.S. Census Bureau, Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA Metro Area, CENSUS REPORTER (2017),
https://censusreporter.org/profiles/31000US42660-seattle-tacoma-bellevue-wa-metro-area/
[https://perma.cc/AK3V-KYJE].
AND
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2019,46 with the national average at 3.8%.47 The information, professional
and business services, and construction sectors are experiencing the fastest
growth in the Greater Seattle Area.48 Also, payroll employment increased
in Washington in January 2019 at a rate of 3.3%,49 which is higher than
the national average of roughly 1%.50 CBRE, JLL, and Cushman &
Wakefield, three of the world’s largest full-service CRES firms, are all
represented in the total payroll numbers for the region, relying on dual
agency as an important revenue stream. Within the Greater Seattle market
the largest firms profiled in Appendix D to the 2014 Conflicts of Interest
Research Report have a strong presence, with the exception of Fischer &
Company; this list includes international full-service CRES firms such as
CBRE Group, JLL, Cushman & Wakefield, Newmark Knight Frank, and
Savills Studley. Also included are tenant-only firms such as Cresa, Hughes
Marino, and Mohr Partners, which compete in the Greater Seattle Area.51
Additionally, some more-local, full-service firms have a significant
presence in the marketplace, such as Kidder Matthews and NAI Puget
Sound Properties.52

46. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., ECONOMY AT A GLANCE, SEATTLE-TACOMA-BELLEVUE (2019),
https://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.wa_seattle_msa.htm [https://perma.cc/P9JP-6ZL2].
47. National Employment Monthly Update, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (June 7, 2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/national-employment-monthlyupdate.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3PPS-K94N].
48. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., supra note 46; see also COLLIERS INT’L, RESEARCH & FORECAST
REPORT: PUGET SOUND REGION Q3 2018 OFFICE REPORT (2018) [hereinafter COLLIERS Q3 2018
OFFICE REPORT], https://www2.colliers.com/en/Research/Puget-Sound/Q3-2018-Office-MarketReport [https://perma.cc/QMD7-F3FR].
49. Strong Payroll Hiring Continues into January, WASH. STATE EMP. SECURITY DEP’T (Mar.
6, 2019), https://esd.wa.gov/newsroom/strong-payroll-hiring-continues-into-january [https://perma.
cc/6MEA-HH6B].
50. See BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., NEWS RELEASE: THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION—APRIL 2019
(May 3, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_05032019.pdf [https://perma.cc
/JRB8-5BPS] (stating that in April, civilian employment was at 258,693,000 with an increase of
263,000 resulting in approximately a 1% increase).
51. See Our Offices Seattle, WA, MOHR PARTNERS, INC., https://www.mohrpartners.com/
location/seattle-wa/ [https://perma.cc/E4T6-SZ9K]; Seattle, CRESA, https://www.cresa.com/seattlewa [https://perma.cc/GD5G-NYST]; Seattle Commercial Real Estate, NEWMARK KNIGHT FRANK,
http://www.ngkf.com/home/about-our-firm/global-offices/us-offices/seattle.aspx [https://perma.cc/
3SG6-SQEY]; Seattle Cushman & Wakefield, CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, http://www.cushman
wakefield.com/en/offices/seattle-1 [https://perma.cc/G8SA-SFN6]; Seattle Office About, CBRE,
http://www.cbre.us/people-and-offices/corporate-offices/seattle
[https://perma.cc/G8M6-APBA];
Seattle
Location,
SAVILLS STUDLEY,
http://www.savills-studley.com/offices/seattle.aspx
[https://perma.cc/P4MM-FLUQ] (though denoting Savills-Studley as a tenant-only firm may be
inaccurate given it is owned by Savills, which offers services for landlords); West Locations, JLL,
https://www.us.jll.com/en/locations/west [https://perma.cc/Z52Z-72T3].
52. About Us, KIDDER MATTHEWS, http://www.kiddermathews.com/ [https://perma.cc/W6A9X636]; Our Team, NAI PUGET SOUND PROPERTIES, https://www.nai-psp.com/our-team/
[https://perma.cc/LV5B-BQM5].
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The Greater Seattle Area, often called the Puget Sound Area, is rather
large and covers a number of cities, including Bellevue, Tacoma, and
Redmond, and there is considerable variance in commercial market trends
between these narrower markets. Although these commercial
marketplaces are complex, they can largely be broken down into four
discrete categories that bear directly on providing an accurate description
of the Greater Seattle Area commercial property marketplace: Office
Space, Industrial, Retail, and Multifamily. The market data below
comprises the most recent data at the time of writing.
D. Office Space
The tech, life sciences, and co-working fields are all powerhouses in
the office space market, with Amazon, WeWork, Stripe, T-Mobile, and
Seattle Genetics all signing notable leases in 201853 and Facebook and
Seattle CBD reflecting sizeable transactions in 2019.54 Demand has also
increased on the Eastside, with Amazon leasing 377,000 square feet of the
proposed Summit III development in Bellevue.55 The Greater Seattle Area
as a whole has seen a positive absorption rate (a measurement of demand
in the market) with a high estimate at 271,53656 square feet and a low
estimate at 6,095 square feet.57 The differences in estimates likely reflect
differing definitions of the geographical boundaries of the Puget Sound or
Greater Seattle Area. The vacancy rate for office space has declined,
reaching the lowest rate since the Great Recession.58 The first quarter
vacancy rate for office space in the Seattle Area was below 10 points at
8.1%.59 By way of contrast nationwide:
Vacant office space in the U.S. increased slightly by 10 basis points
(bps) during the fourth quarter of 2017 (Q4 2017) to 13 percent,
according to the latest analysis from CBRE. For the year, vacancy
inched up 10 bps, marking the first year-over-year increase in
vacancy since 2010.

53. COLLIERS INT’L, RESEARCH & FORECAST REPORT, PUGET SOUND REGION, Q2 2018 OFFICE
(on file with the Seattle University Law Review); NEWMARK KNIGHT FRANK, RESEARCH Q3 2018,
PUGET SOUND OFFICE MARKET (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
54. NEWMARK KNIGHT FRANK, RESEARCH 1Q 2019 PUGET SOUND OFFICE MARKET
[hereinafter NEWMARK Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT], http://www.ngkf.com/Uploads/FileManager
/Market%20Reports/1Q19-Seattle-Office-Market.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C9P-W7CJ].
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. KIDDER Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT, supra note 42.
58. NEWMARK Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT, supra note 54.
59. Id.; see also KIDDER Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT, supra note 42 (estimating vacancy rates at
6.48%).
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The vacancy rate in suburban markets increased 10 bps, to 14.2
percent and downtown vacancy ticked up 10 bps to 10.7 percent.
Vacancy continued to fall in a majority of U.S. office markets, and
the national office vacancy rate remains near its post-recession low.60

And rents are forecast to continue rising.61 Availability of space is
estimated to be at 8.8%62 on the low end or at 12.7% on the high end.63
However, large spaces of greater than 100,000 square feet have become
increasingly scarce.64
Average rents have again reached all-time highs, despite Amazon
leases setting records in the third-quarter of 2018.65 The U.S. index for
commercial office leases was $34.06 per square foot as of the third quarter
of 2018;66 yet, the estimate price per square foot per year for office space
within the city of Seattle is about $42 per square foot.67 When taking the
Greater Seattle Area into account as a whole, the average asking rental
price per square foot ranges between $33.1668 and $37.14.69 7.3 million
square feet of new space is currently under construction, and 62% of the
office space being constructed has been pre-leased.70 Finally, investor
confidence in the region for office space has remained strong, with a
particular emphasis in Seattle and Bellevue.71
Given the remarkable and meteoric rise in Seattle market office rents
and historically low vacancy rates—particularly when compared to a
60. U.S. Office Vacancy Ends 2017 at 13 Percent, CBRE (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.
cbre.com/about/media-center/us-office-vacancy-ends-2017-at-13-percent [https://perma.cc/D7DTGVQ9].
61. NEWMARK Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT, supra note 54.
62. KIDDER Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT, supra note 42.
63. SAVILLS RESEARCH, Q1 2019 SEATTLE (2019) [hereinafter SAVILLS RESEARCH, Q1 2019
REPORT], https://pdf.euro.savills.co.uk/usa/market-reports/research-mim-seattlewa2019q1.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/52CA-TKTS].
64. SAVILLS STUDLEY RESEARCH, SAVILLIS STUDLEY REPORT: SEATTLE OFFICE SECTOR Q3
2018 (2018) [hereafter SAVILLS STUDLEY RESEARCH Q3 2018 REPORT], https://pdf.euro.savills
.co.uk/usa/market-reports/3q18-seattle-office-market-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QUE-QKBL].
65. Compare SAVILLS RESEARCH, Q1 2019 REPORT, supra note 63 (noting steady increase in
rents since third quarter 2018), with SAVILLS STUDLEY RESEARCH Q3 2018 REPORT, supra note 64
(noting all-time high average rents).
66. SAVILLS STUDLEY RESEARCH Q3 2018 REPORT, supra note 64.
67. NAI PUGET SOUND PROPERTIES, MARKET REPORT Q1 2019 OFFICE, INDUSTRIAL & RETAIL,
PUGET SOUND REGION, WASHINGTON [hereinafter PSP Q1 2019 REPORT] (on file with the Seattle
University Law Review) (estimating yearly rental price per square foot at $40.83 for Seattle); KIDDER
Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT, supra note 42 (estimating yearly rental price per square foot in Seattle at
$42.00); NEWMARK Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT, supra note 54 (estimating yearly rental price per square
foot at $43.31).
68. PSP Q1 2019 REPORT, supra note 67.
69. NEWMARK Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT, supra note 54; see also SAVILLS RESEARCH, Q1 2019
REPORT, supra note 63 (estimating rental rates at $38.85).
70. KIDDER Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT, supra note 42.
71. Id.
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national average vacancy rate of almost double—combined with an
accelerating consolidation among the largest, international CRES sector
firms with a substantial market presence in Greater Seattle, which
consolidation has included the absorption of well-established, tenant only
brokerages in the marketplace such as Washington Partners (by JLL in
March 2016),72 the question must be posed whether the landlord’s market
in Greater Seattle is, at least in part, a consequence of too much
concentration at the top?
E. Industrial
The industrial commercial real estate market in the Greater Seattle
Area has an average annual rental price per square foot of $10.39 and a
vacancy rate of approximately 4.2%.73 This sector has seen negative
absorption of 109,577 square feet, though demand remains strong with 5.8
million square feet of space under construction.74 This square footage is
up from the 4.34 million square feet that were under construction at the
end of the third quarter of 2018.75 One of the driving forces behind
warehouse demand has been e-commerce.76
F. Retail
The retail commercial real estate market in the Greater Seattle Area
has an average annual rental price per square foot of $20.81 and a vacancy
rate of approximately 3.2%.77 The absorption rate is positive year-to-date
at 88,217 square feet.78 Although retail absorption as a whole has remained
positive, malls have seen negative absorption of late.79 This negative trend
72. As with the Savills acquisition of pioneering, tenant-only brokerage firm Julian J. Studley in
2008, detailed in the 2014 conflicts of interest research study report, the market absorption by the
former of the latter enterprise did not make Savills a tenant-only brokerage firm. Quite to the contrary:
The acquisition by a full-service CRES firm of an exclusively tenant-only commercial brokerage
merely eliminates another tenant-only brokerage from the range or representation options afforded to
prospective tenants in a given marketplace and allows the acquiring full-service CRES firm to market
its tenant-only services while further proliferating in that market the practice of dual agency. As the
saying goes: “When you dance with the devil, the devil doesn’t change. The devil changes you.”
73. PSP Q1 2019 REPORT, supra note 67.
74. KIDDER MATHEWS, 1ST QUARTER 2019 REAL ESTATE MARKET REVIEW: SEATTLE
INDUSTRIAL, https://kidder.com/wp-content/uploads/market_report/industrial-market-research-seattle
-2019-1q.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ9X-WTRA].
75. Id.
76. COLLIERS INT’L, RESEARCH & FORECAST REPORT, PUGET SOUND REGION, Q3 2018
INDUSTRIAL (2018) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
77. PSP Q1 2019 REPORT, supra note 67.
78. Id.
79. COLLIERS INT’L, RESEARCH & FORECAST REPORT, PUGET SOUND REGION, Q3 2018 RETAIL
(2018) [hereinafter COLLIERS Q3 2018 RETAIL REPORT] (on file with the Seattle University Law
Review).
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for malls will likely continue into 2019, with the closing of several large
chains such as Macy’s, Sears, and JC Penny.80
“Mom and Pop” stores operating in truly urban locations, sometimes
owned by and serving mostly ethnic minorities, are not reflected by the
negative mall absorption rate because their customer base is not as mobile
and such tenants typically seek and occupy walkable neighborhood retail.
Fitness chains have continued to drive demand for retail generally, along
with Amazon opening two Amazon Go stores in the Seattle Area in 2018.81
Note, however, it will take some time nationwide to see where brick and
mortar stores end up against “e-tailers,” with the latter beginning to show
an interest in brick and mortar stores.
G. Multifamily
The multifamily commercial real estate sector has also seen growth,
though this sector of commercial real estate is subject to more significant
regional variance. Year-to-date absorption for Seattle was 13,455 square
feet, with the average asking rent at $1,545 in the last quarter of 2018.82
Urban King County “set a record for price per square foot” despite
transaction volumes being 20% lower than in 2016.83 New construction of
multifamily units has also increased year over year.84 In spring 2018, a
University of Washington study estimated the average King County rent
to be at $1,741 or $2.18 per square foot.85 The vacancy rate for Seattle is
estimated to be at 5.4%,86 with a 3.8% estimate for King County as a
whole.87

80. Id.; KIDDER MATHEWS, REAL ESTATE MARKET OVERVIEW, SEATTLE RETAIL, 1ST QUARTER
2019 [hereinafter KIDDER Q1 2019 RETAIL REPORT], https://kidder.com/wp-content/uploads
/market_report/retail-market-research-seattle-2019-1q.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NGS-LCDJ].
81. COLLIERS Q3 2018 RETAIL REPORT, supra note 79; KIDDER Q1 2019 RETAIL REPORT, supra
note 80.
82. KIDDER MATHEWS, REAL ESTATE MARKET OVERVIEW, SEATTLE MULTIFAMILY, 4TH
QUARTER 2018 [hereinafter KIDDER Q4 2018 MULTIFAMILY REPORT], https://kidder.com/wpcontent/uploads/market_report/multifamily-market-research-seattle-2018-4q.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EV7Q-LDM4].
83. COLLIERS INT’L, New Market Research Sheds Light on Puget Sound Apartment Sales (Feb.
21, 2019), https://www2.colliers.com/en/News/Puget-Sound/2019-Apartment-Market-Study [https://
perma.cc/5FY7-3JJG].
84. KIDDER Q4 2018 MULTIFAMILY REPORT, supra note 82.
85. U. OF WASH. RUNSTAD DEP’T OF REAL ESTATE, WASHINGTON STATE APARTMENT MARKET
REPORT – SPRING 2018 (2018) [hereinafter UW SPRING 2018 STUDY], http://realestate.washington.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/2018SpringApartmentMarketReport.docx.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4
AZ-JKR8].
86. KIDDER Q4 2018 MULTIFAMILY REPORT, supra note 82.
87. UW SPRING 2018 STUDY, supra note 85.
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PART II
Part I provided the context and market realities within which
commercial real estate brokers and agents operate in 2019 under the
statutory licensing scheme initially enacted by the legislature in 1968. The
below Part II provides a detailed examination and analysis of the state of
the law of principal and agent in Washington at the time the legislature
considered moving from a common law regime of duties, obligations,
rights, and expectations among the parties in an agency relationship to a
statutorily defined relationship between real estate brokers and agents, on
the one hand, and their clients—buyers and sellers; tenants and
landlords—on the other. Additionally, Part II examines the legislative
history of Washington’s statutory codification of broker agency duties
under Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 and posits, if it wasn’t
broken, why did the legislature seek to fix it?
A. Law of Principal and Agent under the Common Law (Master and
Servant)
In order to understand the impact of Revised Code of
Washington section 18.86 on the practice of commercial brokerage at the
time of its enactment, it is critical to understand the breadth and depth of
the system it purported to replace at the time of its introduction: The
common law of principal and agent.
Unless superseded by state statute, real estate agents are subject to
the common law of agency. Both agents and brokers in the real estate
industry are licensed professionals according to the state law in the state
wherein their principal place of business is located, and according to any
other state in which they do business, depending on such other states’
laws.88 The licensure and testing requirements, if and when applicable, for
an “agent” are less-onerous than for a “broker.” Agents are allowed to
engage in commercial real estate services such as office leasing only under
the direction and supervision of a licensed broker. Someone who holds a
broker’s license but is working under another licensed broker in a
supervisory role is commonly referred to as an associate broker in order to

88. For a comprehensive analysis of how nine states and the District of Columbia treat real estate
“brokers” or “agents,” see generally SMIRNIOTOPOULOS, 2014 COI STUDY REPORT, supra note 1, at
Appendix E: Comparison of Disparate Commercial Brokerage Regulatory Frameworks. In
Washington State, all professionals must be licensed as “brokers” with more requirements to be a
managing or designated broker with the ability to supervise other brokers. WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 18.85.101, 18.85.111, 18.85.121 (2019).

2019]

David v. Goliath

189

distinguish that associate broker from the role of the supervisory broker
having liability over the associate brokers and agents in that office.89
Under the common law, an agent owes to its principal a duty of
undivided loyalty from which all other fiduciary duties emanate or, at a
minimum, all other duties should be interpreted and evaluated. “An agent
has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters
connected with the agency relationship.”90
An agent’s more specific duties of loyalty include a duty not to
acquire a material benefit from a third party in connection with
transactions or other actions taken on behalf of the principal or
otherwise through the agent’s use of position; a duty not to deal with
the principal as or on behalf of an adverse party; a duty not to compete
with the principal or assist the principal’s competitors during the
duration of the agency relationship; and a duty not to use property of
the principal, and not to use or communicate confidential information
of the principal, for the agent’s own purposes or those of a third party.
A principal may consent to conduct by the agent that would otherwise
breach a duty of loyalty, but in obtaining the principal’s consent, the
agent must act in good faith and fully disclose material information
to the principal.91

An agent also owes its principal a duty of confidentiality. “An agent
is obligated to safeguard his principal’s confidence and secrets. A real
estate broker, therefore, must keep confidential any information that might
weaken his principal’s bargaining position if it were revealed.”92 However,
this duty does not include an obligation to withhold material facts
concerning the condition of the property.93
Agents owe a duty of full disclosure to facilitate well-informed
decisions by the principal. “An agent is obligated to disclose to his
principal all relevant and material information that the agent knows and
that pertains to the scope of the agency.”94 Agents must also exercise
reasonable care and diligence in pursuing the affairs of the principal:

89. For a comparison of the testing and licensure requirements for real estate agents and brokers
in nine states and the District of Columbia, see generally SMIRNIOTOPOULOS, 2014 COI STUDY
REPORT, supra note 1, at Appendix E: Comparison of Disparate Commercial Brokerage Regulatory
Frameworks.
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006).
91. Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049, 1052–53 (2007); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01–8.06 (2006).
92. NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS: RISK MGMT. & LICENSE LAW FORUM, FIDUCIARY DUTIES
(May 15, 2013), http://www.realtor.org/sites/default/files/handouts-and-brochures/2014/nar-fiduciary
-duty-032213.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AT2-SDDP].
93. Id.
94. Id.
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The standard of care expected of a real estate broker representing a
seller or buyer is that of a competent real estate professional. . . . This
duty includes an obligation to affirmatively discover facts relating to
his principal’s affairs that a reasonable and prudent real estate broker
would be expected to investigate. Simply put, this is the same duty
any professional, such as a doctor or lawyer, owes to his patient or
client.95

Finally, an agent has a duty of accountability to the principal and
must account for all money or property a principal has entrusted to the
agent.96
B. The Legislative History of Revised Code of Washington Section 18.86
and the Statutory Scheme Superseding the Common Law of Duties of
Agency for Brokers
As demonstrated above, the prevailing common law of Principal and
Agent in Washington afforded the clients of professional real estate
services a comprehensive set of affirmative duties owed by real estate
brokers and their agents, whether for commercial property or residential
services, to the sellers and buyers, and owners and renters, respectively, of
real property interests. The questions remain, then, what improvements did
the legislature intend to make to the common law of Principal and Agent
in the enactment of Revised Code of Washington section 18.86?
C. 1995–1996, House Bill 1659 and Senate Bill 5554
In 1996, the Washington State Legislature passed House Bill (HB)
1659, codified as Revised Code of Washington section 18.86.97 The
express purpose of this bill was to clarify the duties of real estate agents
for brokers and consumers and, for dual agency, to require express
disclosure as to who the real estate agent is representing.98 However, the
Washington Association of Realtors (WAR), the agency that proposed the
legislation, provided the House Commerce and Labor Committee with a
memorandum that noted two other objectives of the bill were to eliminate
imputed knowledge and vicarious liability and to “reduce instances of dual
agency.”99 After several drafts and amendments, the bill was passed
unanimously.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Bill Information > HB 1659 - 1995-96, WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE, https://app.leg.wa.
gov/billsummary?BillNumber=1659&Initiative=false&Year=1995 [https://perma.cc/RYV8-4AAD].
98. H.R. 54-2EHB 1659, Reg. Sess., at 1–2 (Wash. 1996).
99. Memorandum from Wash. Ass’n of Realtors to House Commerce and Labor Comm., at 1
(Jan. 23, 1996) (on file with the Washington State Archives, House of Representatives Commerce and
Labor Committee, Meeting Files Jan. 29, 1996).
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The bill, in its original form, superseded all common law duties—not
just those inconsistent.100 “This chapter applies to the exclusion of
common law duties and responsibilities of principal and agent which have
to this date been applied to real estate brokers affiliated licensees and their
principals.”101 A similar senate version of this bill with the same language
was described as “supersed[ing] all case law establishing the duties and
responsibilities owed by a licensee to a principal.”102 After negotiations
among stakeholders, the complete exclusion of common law was amended
to supersede common law only to the extent inconsistent with the duties
in the statute.103
In a committee hearing for HB 1659, a representative of the Real
Property section of the Washington State Bar Association expressed
concern that, while well meaning, the drafters of the bill “went too far.”104
He highlighted the risk that unscrupulous people would put blanket
waivers in their forms, waiving duties that were intended to substitute for
the common law duties.105 While this testimony does offer limited insight
into a concern regarding the exclusion of common law in the final bill, the
final bill directly addressed these concerns by making most duties nonwaivable.106 Further, negotiations and further discussion among the
stakeholders appear to have occurred outside the legislative history of the
bill.107 This reduces to mere speculation the reason or reasons why the “not
inconsistent with” exception to existing common law was added before
passage of the legislation.
In HB 1659, as originally introduced, a dual agent did not have a duty
to abstain from actions adverse or detrimental to either party’s interests in
a transaction. Instead, the duty was limited to a specific transaction. A
broker would have had a duty to “take no action that is adverse or
detrimental to the transaction” only after a purchase and sale agreement or
lease was entered into.108 Further, in the original form of the bill, the dual
agent had a duty, owed separately to each party, to buy, sell, or lease a
property at a “price, terms, and conditions acceptable” to the respective

100. H.R. 1659, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11 (original bill, Wash. Feb. 03, 1995).
101. H.R. 1659, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11 (Wash. 1995).
102. S. 54-SB 5554, Reg. Sess., at 1. (Wash. 1995).
103. H.R. 1659, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11 (engrossed bill, Wash. 1996).
104. Regulating Real Estate Brokerage Relationships: Hearing on H.R. 1659 Before House
Comm. On Commerce and Labor, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 36:00–40:40 (Wash. 1997).
105. Id.
106. H.R. 1659, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 4–6 (engrossed bill, Wash. 1996).
107. See Regulating Real Estate Brokerage Relationships: Hearing on Engrossed H.R. 1659
Before House Comm. on Commerce and Labor, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 20:50 (Wash. 1996)
(statement of Sen. Dwight Pelz).
108. H.R. 1659, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 4(1)(c), 5(1)(c), 6(2)(c) (Wash. 1997).
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party.109 Both of these portions were significantly changed between the
first and the second version. For dual agents, the duty regarding taking no
adverse action was changed to “take no action adverse or detrimental to
either party’s interest in a transaction.”110 The “price, terms, and
conditions” duty was removed completely.111
The effect of these changes arguably brings a dual agent’s duty to
take no action detrimental or adverse to the other party’s interests to the
act of negotiating the deals; however, it is difficult to imagine a situation
where a dual agent is not acting adverse to one side or the other in a
negotiation; negotiating upwards or downwards on the price alone would
be detrimental to the other party. Additionally, if this duty of a tenant
representative is only actuated once the Premises have been selected
through a completed search process undertaken by the tenant
representative under a dual agency scenario, many if not all of the common
law duties an agent owes its principal may have already been breached
prior to that triggering point. Accordingly, imposing quasi-fiduciary duties
on a dual agent only in the context of negotiating and documenting a Lease
Agreement for Premises, and only after the selection of Premises through
a process in which the tenant representative’s fiduciary duties at common
law have been violated appears a half-measure, at best, toward protecting
tenants in these transactions. When offering advice or negotiation tactics
to one party to the transaction, the agent is inherently taking action
detrimental to the other side.
It is then ironic that, in seeming to attempt to provide slightly more
protections for principals in the statutory scheme, inherent inability to
satisfy the statutory duties is created. If the duty only applied after a
purchase and sale agreement had been entered into, as contemplated under
the original language of the proposed legislation, an agent would have no
difficulty satisfying the duty to “take no action adverse or detrimental” to
either party during negotiations. If the duty to take no action adverse or
detrimental was limited to after the purchase and sale agreement or lease
was entered into, the negotiations would have been completed and would
not implicate this duty. And if the agent’s duty is to find, sell, or lease a
property at a “price, terms, and conditions acceptable” to the principal,
language which was also removed, the duty can logically be complied with
during negotiations so long as the ultimate deal is acceptable to both
parties. Regardless of the logical difficulties of this reimagining of the duty
of loyalty, the contours of this duty have not been amended since the
statute was enacted.
109. Id. at §§ 6(2)(f)–(g).
110. H.R. 1659, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6(2)(a) (second engrossed bill, Wash. 1996).
111. See id. at §§ 4–6.
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D. 1997–1998, House Bill 1955
In 1997, the legislature made worse the inherent inadequacies of, and
inequities visited upon tenants through, the original enactment of HB 1659
by enacting an emergency amendment to the statute through HB 1995.112
This amendment clarified some language and added that different brokers
within the same firm representing buyers competing for a single seller or
sellers competing for a single buyer does not by itself create a conflict of
interest.113 The underlying reason for this amendment was to give parties
the ability to terminate an agency relationship by notice, instead of just by
expiration, completion, or mutual agreement; something that has nothing
to do with this “clarification” of the conflict of interest rules in a way that
makes dual agency representation easier for the commercial brokerage
community.
E. 2013, Substitute Senate Bill 5352 and House Bill 1487
In 2013, the legislature again amended Revised Code of Washington
section 18.86, this time through Substitute Senate Bill (SSB) 5352. This
amendment had two purposes. The first purpose was to bring the statute in
line with the new language used in the recently amended real estate broker
licensing statute, Revised Code of Washington section 18.85.114 To this
end, the word licensee was replaced with broker throughout the statute and
other language was amended.
The second purpose was to provide and clarify that the statute
superseded all common law fiduciary duties. As such, the legislature made
the following changes to Revised Code of Washington section 18.86.110,
with underlined text being added and strike-through text being removed:
The duties under this chapter are statutory duties and not fiduciary
duties. This chapter supersedes ((only the duties of the parties under
the common law, including)) the fiduciary duties of an agent to a
principal ((, to the extent inconsistent with this chapter)) under the
common law. The common law continues to apply to the parties in
all other respects.115

This intent was echoed by the public testimony during a Senate
committee on commerce and labor hearing of the bill.
The Appellate Court in Division II made a decision that flew in the
face of agency law regarding the fiduciary duty of real estate brokers
112. H.R. 1955, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997).
113. H.R. 55-HB 1955, Reg. Sess., at 3 (Wash. 1997).
114. S. 5352, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess., at 4 (substitute senate bill, Wash. 2013); see also H.R. 63HB 1487, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013).
115. S. 5352, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess., at 11 (substitute senate bill, Wash. 2013).
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to clients. The Supreme Court corrected the issue in a recent decision
and said the agency law speaks for itself and the statutory duties
control. The Court also said a broker owes a statutory fiduciary duty.
This bill clarifies the duty owed by a broker to a consumer.116

The public testimony above was likely referring to Jackowski v.
Borchelt,117 and the Division II Court of Appeals decision Jackowski v.
Borchelt,118 although references to these two cases do not appear explicitly
in the legislative history of Substitute Senate Bill (SSB) 5352. The Court
of Appeals in Jackowski stated that “[f]or clarity, we reiterate that chapter
18.86 RCW does not abrogate professional and fiduciary duties of real
estate agents.”119 The correction on this point from the Washington
Supreme Court came when it stated the following: “Since the language of
the statute, RCW 18.86.110, is not ambiguous, we will not construe it to
mean anything different from what it says: common law duties continue
only to the extent they have not been limited by or are not otherwise
inconsistent with the statute.”120
Although the stated purpose was to correct a “misconception” that
the statutory duties superseded common law fiduciary duties, the
amendment to Revised Code of Washington section 18.86.110 went
further than simply correcting any misconceptions. It removed the
language “to the extent inconsistent with this chapter.” This change
superseded all common law duties and related case law a real estate agent
would owe to their principals under the common law of agency.121
The significant removal of the “to the extent inconsistent” language
was treated as a “housekeeping” matter in the public testimony for HB
1487, a similar bill that was not ultimately passed but under which most
of the meaningful public testimony relating to SSB 5352 actually took
place. Public testimony indicated that this bill merely clarified the existing
relationships and duties under Revised Code of Washington section 18.86
and did not change the effect of the law as it was originally passed in
116. S. 63-SB 5352, Reg. Sess., at 4 (Wash. 2013) (summary of public testimony); see also
Clarifying the Terminology and Duties of the Real Estate Agency Relationship Law to Be Consistent
with Other Existing Laws: Hearing on SB 5352 Before Senate Commerce and Labor Comm., 63rd
Leg., Reg. Sess., at 48:45 (Wash. 2013).
117. See Jackowski v. Borchelt, 278 P.3d 1100 (Wash. 2012).
118. See Jackowski v. Borchelt, 209 P.3d 514 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
119. Id. at 520 (emphasis added).
120. Jackowski, 278 P.3d at 1107.
121. See Pence v. John L. Scott, Inc., No. C13-5837 RBL, 2013 WL 6096233, at *1 (W.D. Wash.
Nov. 20, 2013) (“In place of common law fiduciary duties, the Washington State legislature has
prescribed statutory duties that real estate brokers owe their clients.”); see also Shahbazian Family Tr.
v. O’Neil, No. C16-5477 BHS, 2017 WL 2964821, at *22–23 (W.D. Wash. July 12, 2017) (citing
Pence v. John L. Scott, Inc., 2013 WL 6096233, to support its ruling that summary judgment was
appropriate denying a claim of breach of fiduciary duty on the basis of no fiduciary duty being owed).
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1996.122 Further, the testimony indicated that the bill did not lessen the
duties owed to consumers by brokers.123 The comment relating to duties
not being lessened was likely referring to duties brokers owed to
consumers after 1996 and not the duties brokers would owe to principals
under the common law.
The full effect of SSB 5352 removing the “to the extent not
inconsistent” language is unclear. Washington courts have not
significantly interpreted the scope of the statutory duties provided in
Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 since the 2013 amendment.
Further, the legislature’s removal of the words “to the extent not
inconsistent with this chapter” and the additional text stating that duties
under Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 are statutory in nature
and not fiduciary seems to suggest that Washington’s case law interpreting
such fiduciary duties is not applicable to interpreting these statutory duties.
However, during public testimony, Representative Zack Hudgins
stated that the bill would ideally capture all duties under common law and
codify them as statutory duties.124 This statement, when combined with the
public testimony that the bill would not lessen duties brokers owed, seems
to suggest that agency case law is still useful and applicable in determining
the scope of a broker’s duties.
It is beyond peradventure, viewing in totality the legislative history
of Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 since the legislature’s 1996
introduction of these new statutory provisions, that the legislature has
sought to favor commercial property owners and the commercial
brokerage firms that serve as listing brokers for those properties. This was
recognized by one real estate broker whose written testimony for a hearing
was that “WAR is pushing agency regulation reform, primarily at the
behest of the large big-city offices. But this particular legislation has not
been shown to Realtors in general—the people who will have to deal with
its effects daily.”125 This favoritism works to the significant disadvantage
of tenants seeking commercial space in the marketplace, when the legal
relationships of these disparate and adverse parties are viewed in the
context of what came before that statute: a legal regime governed by the
well-established and long-standing common law of principal and agent.
Moreover, it would not be unreasonable to conclude, given the lack of
122. Clarifying the Terminology and Duties of the Real Estate Agency Relationship Law to Be
Consistent with Other Existing Laws: Hearing on HB 1487 Before H. Comm. on Bus. & Fin. Serv.,
63rd Leg., Reg. Sess., at 38:00–39:30 (Wash. 2013).
123. Id. at 39:15–25.
124. Id. at 42:08–42:50.
125. Letter from Thorn Ward, Century 21 Ocean Shores, to Labor, Commerce & Trade Comm.
Members (Feb. 15, 1996) (on file in the Washington State Archives, Senate Labor, Commerce, &
Trade Committee Meeting Files Feb. 15, 1996) (emphasis in original).
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transparency as reflected in the dearth of documentation and lack of
transcripts of meetings among special interests and legislators in the
legislative history, that the legislators and special interests involved,
including the commercial real estate services sector participants active in
Washington in the Greater Seattle Area, Washington’s most-active
commercial market, that these changes were intended to benefit large fullservice CRES firms to the detriment of commercial tenants.
Additionally, beyond the above speculation—albeit well-reasoned—
regarding the business motivations prompting the enactment of and
subsequent amendments to Revised Code of Washington section 18.86, a
perplexing question remains unanswered for dual agency: When the
legislature clearly did not want the duty of loyalty in its common law form
to be present in the statutory framework, but also wanted agents to exercise
some level of loyalty, how much loyalty does a broker owe to a client
under the statutory scheme? And how can a dual agent take no action
adverse to either party in the transaction during negotiations or at other
stages of the representation? Then-Representative Cyrus Habib noted this
conflict in a question during public testimony for SB 5352, but the
question was not fully answered.126 Instead, the answer to this question
appeared to conflate the duty to take no action adverse or detrimental to
either side in a dual agency representation with the duty to not disclose
confidential information and the duty to disclose a conflict.127
This question is poorly, but partially answered, by the statute
providing for the case of a commercial brokerage firm where two separate
agents represent the commercial tenant and the commercial landlord. In
this situation, the designated broker and the supervising managing
broker(s) would be the dual agent(s).128 As such, the duty to take no action
adverse to either party in the transaction would be likely be fulfilled by
taking nearly no action. Yet, if the managing broker is actively
supervising, it is likely that an individual will be faced with the same
ethical issues with which a single dual agent representing both sides would
be faced.
126. Clarifying the Terminology and Duties of the Real Estate Agency Relationship Law to Be
Consistent with Other Existing Laws: Hearing on HB 1487 Before H. Comm. on Bus. & Fin. Serv.,
63rd Leg., Reg. Sess., at 39:40–42:05 (Wash. 2013).
127. Id.
128. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.86.020(2) (2019) states that:
In a transaction in which different brokers affiliated with the same firm represent different
parties, the firm’s designated broker and any managing broker responsible for the
supervision of both brokers, is a dual agent, and must obtain the written consent of both
parties as required under RCW 18.86.060. In such case, each of the brokers shall solely
represent the party with whom the broker has an agency relationship, unless all parties
agree in writing that the broker is a dual agent.
Id.
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PART III
Part I provided the context and market realities within which
commercial real estate brokers and agents operate in 2019 under this
statutory licensing scheme initially enacted by the legislature in 1968. Part
II of this Article examined the status of the Law of Principal and Agent at
the time Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 was enacted to
supplant these common law principles, as well as the statute’s legislative
history. Part III will explore the common law of Principal and Agent as
applied to relevant real estate transactions in Washington, including a
discussion of relevant case law; address various conflicts of interests
prohibited under Revised Code of Washington section 18.86; and review
potential remedies for violations of those prohibitions.
A. Washington’s Common Law of Agency for Real Estate Brokers Prior
to Being Superseded
Before the legislature’s enactment of HB 1659, creating Revised
Code of Washington section 18.86, Washington common law offered a
comprehensive and very robust set of legal principles applying to the
relationships of agents and principals, and governing the behaviors of
agents towards their principals in instances where those behaviors run
contrary to those principles.
These common law duties an agent owes to a principal in the
commercial real estate context, though superseded by Revised Code of
Washington section 18.86, were, and continue to be despite being
superseded, vital for tenants to receive the representation they need and
expect in a commercial leasing context. To better understand the genuine
importance of these common law duties, consider a relevant analogy: The
relationship between a harried mother (the principal) seeking a specific
gift her son has asked Santa to bring him for Christmas and the Macy’s
Toy Department Santa (the agent).
Devotees of Valentine Davies’ Miracle on 34th Street—not any of the
disappointing remakes and not the version where they have added color,
mind you—will already have recognized the movie from the above brief
description of one of the pivotal scenes in the movie. For those unfamiliar
with Miracle on 34th Street, Mr. Kris Kringle (Santa Clause) decides to
live among us in New York City between Thanksgiving and Christmas
Eve because he’s concerned about the annual evaporation of Christmas
spirit and its deleterious impact on the holiday itself, which Mr. Kringle,
of course, holds sacrosanct (naturally).129 Not having a plan for how he is
going to blend in while in New York—as you might imagine, regardless
129. MIRACLE ON 34TH STREET (20th Century Fox 1947).
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of how he dresses, he still looks very much like Santa Clause—Mr.
Kringle opportunistically takes a job as the Toy Department Santa at the
Flagship Macy’s on 34th Street in Manhattan after the Santa in the
Christmas float for the Macy’s Thanksgiving Day Parade is found quite
inebriated.130
In posing as Macy’s Toy Department Santa, Mr. Kringle quickly
learns his job responsibilities focus primarily on hoodwinking young
children sitting on Santa’s lap into desiring toys which are overstocked in
the store. Mr. Kringle’s “Santa orientation” takes place in the employee
locker room with Mr. Schelhammer, who heads Macy’s Toy
Department.131 During this orientation, Mr. Schelhammer counsels Mr.
Kringle in “how to be a good Santa,” and the audience unknowingly gets
a lesson in the Law of Principal and Agent.132
As soon as Mr. Schelhammer departs the locker room, Alfred, the
janitor, offers a brief soliloquy on the perils of “bad isms,” with
“commercialism” being the “woist,” in his very thick Brooklyn accent. On
the one hand, in his role as the Macy’s Toy Department Santa, Mr. Kringle
owes Mr. Schelhammer a duty of loyalty to follow the direction to
hoodwink children.133 On the other hand, Kris Kringle has a competing
duty to serve Christmas, and at the behest of Alfred, Mr. Kringle clearly
rejects the notion of serving Mr. Schelhammer at the expense of
Christmas, thereby rejecting being the principal in a principal-and-agent
relationship.
In the second, seminal but subtler scene from Miracle on 34th Street
with lessons on the Law of Principal and Agent, Mr. Kringle is chatting
with Peter, who is sitting on his lap and telling Santa that he wants a red
fire engine that squirts real water (which Peter promises Santa he’ll never
use inside the house).134 Meanwhile, Peter’s mother (played to perfection
by Martha Raye), who has steadfastly remained within earshot of this
otherwise charming exchange, is doing her best to clandestinely signal to
Santa that she’s been all over Manhattan and no one sells the coveted red
fire engine.135 Imagine her shocked exasperation when, despite her efforts
to get Santa to persuade Peter that he’d like a different toy for Christmas,
Mr. Kringle promises Peter that red fire engine is precisely what he’ll be
getting for Christmas.136 When Peter’s mother sends him off to the side
because she “wants to have a word with Santa Clause,” she dresses Mr.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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Kringle down for promising Peter a toy that doesn’t exist in New York
City.137 To her complete dismay, Mr. Kringle pulls a small notebook out
of his red suit, opens it up, and let’s Peter’s mother know she “can get that
fire truck, at Schoenfeld’s on Lexington Avenue,” and for a great price,
which he quotes.
Still flabbergasted by Mr. Kringle unselfishly sending her to another
store to get precisely what her son wants for Christmas, Peter’s mother
buttonholes Mr. Schelhammer in the Macy’s Toy Department, who is
equally flabbergasted because he has just witnessed first-hand Mr. Kringle
sending a number of Macy’s customers to other stores, including arch rival
Gimbel’s across the street, to find precisely what they want.138 This scene
sets up the central narrative of the movie, with Mr. Macy deciding to
implement Mr. Kringle’s policy of “giving customers exactly what they
want” storewide and, eventually, nationwide.139
So what exactly do these scenes have to do with commercial leasing,
the common law of principal and agent, and Revised Code of Washington
section 18.86? Plenty. In the first scene recalled above, where Mr.
Schelhammer is instructing Kris Kringle on “how to be a good Santa,” his
guidance is much like the relationship between a tenant representative and
a listing broker in a full-service CRES firm. It is incumbent on the tenant
representative to help the listing broker to lease the empty building spaces
in the building(s) of the landlord who has hired the full-service brokerage
firm, just as Mr. Schelhammer needs his agent, Kris Kringle, to help
Macy’s empty out their overstocked inventory of toys for Christmas. In
Mr. Schelhammer’s world, just as in that of the listing agent, the most
important duty is to the firm—not the customer.
In the second scene recalled above, Kris Kringle demonstrates what
all prospective tenants want and believe they have a right to expect in the
principal and agent relationship entered into between a client and a
commercial leasing agent: that the agent is going to represent the principal
objectively, professionally, and diligently, exercising a duty of undivided
loyalty with an exclusive focus on securing a premises and on terms that
are all in the tenant’s best interests. No self-dealing; no hidden agenda;
and no serving another master, disclosed or otherwise, other than the
client. This is what the common law of principal and agent commands, this
is what tenants expect in commercial leasing transactions, and this is how
commercial leasing should operate every time, in every transaction.
Given the intention of the Washington State Legislature to replace
the common law duties agents owe their principals in 1996 through the
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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passage of House Bill 1659, codified as Revised Code of Washington
section 18.86, Sing v. John L. Scott, Inc., which was decided in 1997 on
facts existing prior to the effective date of the statute, offers one of the best
expositions of Washington’s common law duties as they existed prior to
being superseded by statute.140 And the dissenting opinion of Justice Philip
A. Talmadge, in which Chief Justice Durham and Justice Alexander
concurred, contains much of this exposition.141 Sing involved John L. Scott
representing both a prospective buyer, Sing, and a seller, with a third John
L. Scott agent competing with, and ultimately prevailing over the
prospective buyer.142 The majority viewed this as a case where the firm’s
primary fiduciary duties were owed to the seller, with any duties owed to
the prospective buyer, Sing, being secondary.143 The relevant facts of the
case and majority decision are addressed in greater detail later in this
Article under the analysis of relevant cases.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Talmadge deviated from the
majority’s view principally by viewing the facts presented as
fundamentally an “insider-trading” or self-dealing case.144 He then
proceeded to apply the fact pattern to the common law and statutory duties
an agent owes its principal, as well as to the general duties that real estate
brokers and agents owe to the integrity of the marketplace.145 His
perspective embraced the notion that without the commitment and
obligations of real estate brokers and agents to the integrity of the
marketplace, the entire marketplace would collapse because the
participants that the marketplace is intended to serve—prospective sellers
and purchasers—could have no reasonable expectations of the integrity of
each transaction in that marketplace.146 Justice Talmadge also made an
argument regarding the fiduciary duties of all parties to contractual
arrangements of good faith and fair dealing.147 In making these arguments
against the majority opinion and in favor of a different outcome
determined by the Supreme Court of Washington, Justice Talmadge relied
on three seminal cases as precedent supporting his dissenting opinion:
Mersky v. Multiple Listing Bureau;148 Cantwell v. Nunn;149 and Badgett v.
Security State Bank.150
140. See generally Sing v. John L. Scott, Inc., 948 P.2d 816 (Wash. 1997).
141. Id. at 821 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 817–19 (majority opinion).
143. Id. at 820.
144. Id. at 821 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 822–26.
146. Id. at 826.
147. Id. at 824.
148. Mersky v. Multiple Listing Bureau of Olympia, Inc., 437 P.2d 897 (Wash. 1968).
149. Cantwell v. Nunn, 88 P. 1023 (Wash. 1907).
150. Badgett v. Security State Bank, 807 P.2d 356 (Wash. 1991).
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B. Common Law Fiduciary Duties Real Estate Brokers Owe Their
Principals
In his dissenting opinion in Sing, Justice Talmadge cited Mersky v.
Multiple Listing Bureau for its statements about the fiduciary duties of real
estate brokers, which in the commercial leasing context would be owed to
prospective tenants if the broker represented the tenant.151 Specifically in
this regard, Justice Talmadge quoted from the Mersky case as follows:
[T]here flows from this agency relationship [of a property owner and
the listing broker] and its accompanying obligation of utmost fidelity
and good faith, the legal, ethical, and moral responsibility on the part
of the listing broker, as well as his subagents, to exercise reasonable
care, skill, and judgment in securing for the principal the best bargain
possible; to scrupulously avoid representing any interest antagonistic
to that of the principal in transactions involving the principal’s listed
property, . . . to make, in all instances, a full, fair, and timely
disclosure to the principal of all facts within the knowledge or coming
to the attention of the broker or his subagents which are, or may be,
material in connection with the matter for which the broker is
employed, and which might affect the principal’s rights and interests
or influence his actions.152

Intentionally excluded from the above excerpt from Justice
Talmadge’s dissenting opinion is the common law prohibition against a
broker and its “subagents” engaging in self-dealing with regard to the
principal’s property entrusted to the broker. This was a significant aspect
in the Sing case, and is omitted here only because it is taken up separately
in the section of this Article addressing situations in which, through the
broker’s ownership of other properties and property interests, a broker may
be engaging in self-dealing to the broker’s benefit and potentially to the
tenant client’s detriment without the latter’s advance knowledge and
consent in the dual agency context.153
The duties highlighted in the Sing case are fundamentally the same
duties an agent owes its principal as stated in in the Restatement (Third)

151. See Sing v. John L. Scott, Inc., 948 P.2d 816 (Wash. 1997) (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 822–23 (Talmadge, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing Mersky, 437 P.2d at 898–
99).
153. While referring to and excerpting from Justice Talmadge’s dissenting opinion in Sing,
above, for the propositions for which Justice Talmadge, in each specific instance, set them forth in his
dissenting opinion, the authors of this Article make clear, regarding the specific language from Mersky
upon which Justice Talmadge relied, that advance disclosure and signed, written consent do not fully,
from a policy standpoint, overcome the inherent conflicts of interest presented where the same broker
represents the interests of adverse parties on both sides of the same transaction.
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of Agency,154 as well as in the 2014 Conflicts of Interest research study
report: unbroken service and loyalty (also referred to as the “duty of
undivided loyalty”); confidentiality; full disclosure of information to allow
well-informed decisions by the principal; acting in the best interest of the
client; reasonable care and diligence; and accountability to the principal.
It is difficult to imagine a set of principles, rules, regulations, or
statutory provisions that would better protect a principal in an agency
relationship. Yet in enacting, and then subsequently amending, Revised
Code of Washington section 18.86, the Washington State Legislature has
consistently eroded the scope and extent of these common law protections
previously afforded commercial tenants in their business relationships
with their real estate brokers.
In challenging the court’s majority in Sing, Justice Talmadge also
took specific note of statutory precedent under the Washington State
Legislature’s 1941 Real Estate Brokers and Salespersons Act that said it
was supposed “to protect the general public from negligent, unscrupulous,
or dishonest real estate operators.”155 Justice Talmadge concluded that the
agent of the real estate brokerage firm engaged to market and sell, as the
“listing broker” or record for the property owner’s home, who purchased
that home using information only available to that agent as a consequence
of her employment with and by the listing broker, violated both common
law fiduciary duties and statutory duties under Washington law.156 Justice
Talmadge determined that the agent of the listing broker, in participating
in the transaction for her own and her husband’s personal interests, “had a
statutory duty to conduct herself in a way free of bad faith, dishonesty, or
untrustworthiness. She owed this duty both to the [sellers and the
aggrieved, potential buyer of seller’s home].”157
C. The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under Common Contract
Law
Beyond both the fiduciary duties of agents to their principals under
Washington common law applicable to the broker and its agents in the
Sing case, as well as the existing statutory duties of agents to their
principals under the state’s applicable statutes, parties owe general duties
of good faith and fair dealing in a contractual relationship. Justice
Talmadge’s dissenting opinion invited the majority’s attention to these
154. Although Justice Talmadge’s dissenting opinion, in relevant part, relied upon Restatement
(Second) of Agency in order to bring these arguments forward into the 21st Century, the authors have
chosen to excerpt, above, the most recent edition of the Restatement of Agency.
155. Sing v. John L. Scott, Inc., 948 P.2d 816, 824 (Wash. 1997) (Talmadge, J., dissenting)
(citing Nuttall v. Dowell, 639 P.2d 832, 838 (Wash. 1982)).
156. Id. at 825–26.
157. Id. at 824 (emphasis added).
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common law contract principles applicable to the questionable
transactions the broker and its agents entered into, or allowed to transpire,
to the detriment of the plaintiff, and potentially to the detriment of the
seller of the property. Had the interested buyers been encouraged or even
allowed to compete for the purchase of the seller’s property, the final sales
price might well have been greater than the sales price reflected in the final
purchase contract between the seller and the agent of the listing broker
acting in her own interests. Specifically, Justice Talmadge noted that under
common law principles of contract, in this instance applicable because the
property owner had a signed contract with the listing broker, the latter, and
by extension to the broker’s agents, were subject to the “implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing in every contract.”158
D. The Duty of Undivided Loyalty: How Washington Case Law Has
Interpreted a Broker’s Duty of Loyalty to a Client at Common Law and
Under Revised Code of Washington Section 18.86
The fact that the professional practice of real estate representation
has been governed since the enactment of HB 1659 in 1996
notwithstanding, understanding how Washington courts have interpreted
and applied the common law of Principal and Agent to specific fact
patterns is critical to understanding how the common law principles
applied to the representation of principals by agents prior to Revised Code
of Washington section 18.86, and equally as critical to understanding how
the duties and obligations agents owe to their principals changed
fundamentally under the new statutory licensure and regulatory scheme.
E. Mersky v. Multiple Listing Bureau
In Mersky v. Multiple Listing Bureau, Alyce Thompson, a broker,
represented the sellers of a home.159 The house was listed for $39,750, and
the sellers rejected an offer of $32,500.160 Mrs. Thompson then showed
the property to her sister and brother-in-law, who offered $33,000.161 Mrs.
Thompson urged the seller to accept the offer and advised the sellers that
accepting the offer would be wise, even though it would mean a financial
loss for the sellers.162 The sellers accepted the offer and the deal closed.163
Sometime later, after the buyers made improvements to the property, the

158. Id. (citing Badgett v. Security State Bank, 807 P.2d 356, 360 (Wash. 1991)).
159. Mersky v. Multiple Listing Bureau of Olympia, Inc., 437 P.2d 897, 898 (Wash. 1968).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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property was resold for $46,000.164 The sellers sued the broker alleging
that the failure to disclose kinship ties to the purchaser amounted to a
breach of the duty of loyalty.165
The Washington Supreme Court held that such failure to disclose
kinship ties amounted to fraud in law or constructive fraud because the
agent had a duty of undivided loyalty to the principal.166 This constructive
fraud would exist regardless of whether the broker could show that the
breach was not intentional or deliberate.167 The court reasoned that the
remedy for such a breach was “to rescind the transaction, recover any
profit gained by the broker from the transaction, or recoup the commission
paid to the broker by virtue of the transaction.”168 In support of this
holding, the court reasoned that the purpose behind the rule and the
remedies was the following:
The rule and the available remedies, instead, are designed as much to
prevent fraud as to redress it, and follow directly upon the heels of
the broker’s deliberate or innocent failure to timely and fully disclose
to his principal the fact of the interdicted relationship, for the reason
that the very existence of the relationship may have corroded the
broker’s obligation of undivided loyalty, may have been a material
circumstance to the principal, or may have affected his actions or
decisions in the course of the transaction involved.169

The court noted that this principle was recognized in Hay v. Long,
where an agent leased a principal’s property to the agent’s wife.170 The
court also noted that Frissel v. Newman implemented this principle.171 The
Frissel court discussed a real estate agent’s “duty to fully inform his
principal of the indirect acquisition by a subagent of an interest in the listed
property.”172
F. Sing v. John L. Scott
In Sing v. John L. Scott, the Rudds listed residential property through
Jody Prongay, an agent of John L. Scott, a residential brokerage firm
licensed as such in Washington.173 The plaintiff, Sing, was represented by
Bob Pennock, another agent of the John L. Scott residential brokerage.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 900.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 899 (citing Hay v. Long, 139 P. 761 (Wash. 1914)).
171. Id. at 901.
172. Id. at 901 (citing Frisell v. Newman, 429 P.2d 864, 868 (Wash. 1967)).
173. Sing v. John L. Scott, Inc., 948 P.2d 816, 817 (Wash. 1997).
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Sing saw the Rudds’ listed property and put in an offer for $41,000 through
his agent, Pennock.174 In response to Sing’s offer, the Rudds sent a
counteroffer at $45,000 with other changes.175 Sing stated he would sign
the counteroffer, but also that he was going out of town and would prefer
to sign it on Sunday evening.176 On Sunday, yet another agent with the
John L. Scott firm, Maureen Buckley, along with her husband, put in an
offer for the listed property at $42,000 with a shorter feasibility study time
and sooner closing date than Sing’s offer.177 Prongay, the Rudds’ agent,
called Pennock, Sing’s agent, to ask whether the counteroffer had been
accepted, and Pennock informed Prongay that Sing had not yet come back
into town.178 Prongay informed Pennock that the sellers would be
withdrawing their still extant counteroffer to Sing, inasmuch as it had yet
to be accepted. In response to learning this new information, the Rudds,
who had access to the listing agent’s files and may have reviewed the
history of the offers previously made on the house, presented an offer of
purchase to the Buckleys at $45,000, which was accepted.179
Among other claims, Sing sued John L. Scott and the Buckleys for
violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA).180 The jury
returned a verdict finding John L. Scott, instead of the Buckleys, in
violation of the CPA.181 The appellate court, in upholding the jury verdict,
reasoned that the jury could infer: “(1) that Buckley had access to the
listing file for the Rudd property, (2) that Buckley had seen the Sing offer,
and (3) that Buckley had an unfair advantage over Sing because she could
craft her offer so it was slightly more appealing than Sing’s offer.”182
The Washington Supreme Court reversed. Under the common law of
agency in Washington, it reasoned that John L. Scott’s primary fiduciary
duty was to the seller. This reasoning was despite the undivided duty of
loyalty an agent owed to its principal. As such, any duty to keep a buyer’s
offer confidential could not be reconciled with a broker’s duty to obtain
for the seller the best possible deal, and the duty to the seller took
precedence.183

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 818.
177. Id. (the shorter feasibility study time was offered as one of the reasons why the sellers
rejected Sing’s offer, but this proffered reason was not found to be dispositive).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 819.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 820.
183. Id. at 821.
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In a strongly worded dissent,184 Justice Talmadge opined that there
were breaches of duties amounting to self-dealing.185 Alternatively, the
dissent argued that a fraud on the market theory could be applied to this
fact pattern.186 The fraud being the misappropriation of Sing’s confidential
information for the benefit of a John L. Scott agent.187
Although Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 was not in
effect at the time of the agency relationship in Sing v. John L. Scott, the
court seemed to imply that the statute would have made a difference under
this fact pattern.188
G. Jackowski v. Borchelt
In Jackowski v. Borchelt, Timothy Jackowski and Eri Takase
purchased a home from David and Robin Borchelt in 2014.189 The parties
were represented by separate brokerages.190 In 2016, the Jackowski and
Takase’s home was damaged by a landslide, and the Jackowskis sued the
Borchelts for rescission of the contract, or alternatively for fraud,
fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of
contract.191 The Jackowskis sued the brokers, alleging similar fraud-based
claims including breach of common law fiduciary duties related to the
property being in a landslide zone.192 The trial court dismissed most of the
claims on summary judgment, with the exception of fraudulent
concealment claims based on the sellers and the sellers’ broker allegedly
covering cracks in the foundation with carpet.193 The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court’s ruling, with the exception of statutory and
common law breach of fiduciary duty.194
The Washington Supreme Court partially reversed the court of
appeals, holding, in part, that sufficient evidence existed to survive
summary judgment as to whether the brokers violated Washington’s
statutory duty to refer clients to experts for matters beyond the scope of
the broker’s expertise. Notably, the court recognized that Washington had
184. For a more detailed discussion of Justice Talmadge’s dissent, see supra Part II.
185. Sing, 948 P.2d at 825 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 825–26.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 820 n.3 (majority opinion) (discussing the dual agency duties established under
Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 of confidentiality and to take no action adverse or
detrimental to either party, but ultimately concluding that Revised Code of Washington section 18.86
was not in effect at the time).
189. Jackowski v. Borchelt, 278 P.3d 1100, 1102–03 (Wash. 2012).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1103.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1103–04.
194. Id.
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superseded common law fiduciary duties. In support of its reasoning, the
court interpreted Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 as allowing
a dual agent broker to take actions that may not be in one of the principal’s
best interests.195 This is despite Revised Code of Washington section
18.86.060(a), which prohibits dual agent brokers from taking any action
that is adverse or detrimental to either party’s interest in a transaction.
H. Vertical World v. Colliers International
In Vertical World, Colliers International acted as a dual agent, with
an agent from the firm representing Vertical World and an agent from the
firm representing the commercial property owner, Jack Lothrop.196
Lothrop moved to evict his tenant, Big Bear, in September 1996, and hired
a broker from Colliers International to list the property that same month.
Vertical World learned of the property in January 1997 and put in a
proposal on January 31st.197 Lothrop countered on February 5th and
renovations began on March 4th, a month before closing.198 However,
Vertical World alleged that if the agent had informed Vertical World about
the property four months earlier, when it first went on the market, they
would not have needed to spend extra money accelerating construction and
extending memberships while its Fremont location was undergoing
renovations.199
Although this case arose from a summary judgment motion, the facts
give rise to a conflict of duties. Lothrop testified that although he was
evicting the prior tenant, he was giving them some grace because he hoped
they would be bought out or be able to come up with the past due rents,
and he testified that he asked his agent to slow down on showing the
building in the fall of 1996.200 Finally, Lothrop testified that he would not
have considered leasing the property to Vertical World until January
1997.201 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Colliers
International.202
The court noted that there was equivocal evidence that suggested
Lothrop may have leased the building to Vertical World earlier.203 As such,
195. Id. at 1106–07 (“[A] single broker may represent multiple sellers and buyers at the same
time even though their interests may conflict.”).
196. Vertical World, Inc. v. Colliers Int’l Prop. Consultants, Inc., No. 44718-1-I, 2000 WL
1144980, at *1–2 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2000).
197. Id. at *4.
198. Id. at *5–6.
199. Id. at *6.
200. Id. at *9–10.
201. Id. at *7.
202. Id. at *7–8.
203. Id. at *9–10.
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the court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for a
trial.204 However, no trial took place and the parties settled.205
The seller appears to have asked his agent to take a slow approach to
marketing the property in the fall but did not ask the agent to take the
property off the market, which is what the claim of injury arises from.
Because the property was still on the market, the interests of the landlord
in taking a slow approach to marketing the property were placed in direct
conflict with the interests of the ultimate tenant, Vertical World. By
executing the landlord’s wishes, Colliers International arguably took
action to the detriment of Vertical World in contravention of the statutory
duties provided by Revised Code of Washington section 18.86.
I. Potential Remedies for Conflicts of Interest Violating
a Commercial Real Estate Broker’s Duties Under
Revised Code of Washington Section 18.86
1. Prohibitions Against Conflicts of Interest Under Revised Code of
Washington Section 18.86
A number of provisions exist within Washington’s statutory broker
duty scheme addressing, directly or indirectly, conflicts of interest when
representing tenants or buyers. The duties a broker owes to a principal
under Washington’s statutory scheme vary depending on whether the
broker is acting as a dual agent, or solely as a buyer or selling agent.
Regardless of which side the broker represents, among other duties, the
broker must deal honestly and in good faith, present all written offers in a
timely manner, and “disclose in writing to all parties to whom the broker
renders real estate brokerage services, before the party signs an offer in a
real estate transaction handled by the broker.”206 However, an agent may
not act as a dual agent until a broker has received “written consent of both
parties to the transaction,” and the “consent must include a statement of
the terms of compensation.”207
As a buyer or tenant’s agent a broker additionally has the following
relevant duties:
(a) [t]o be loyal to the buyer by taking no action that is adverse or
detrimental to the buyer’s interest in a transaction;
(b) [t]o timely disclose to the buyer any conflicts of interest;

204. Id. at *17.
205. In Re Vertical World Inc., No. 98-2-03767-9 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 06, 1998).
206. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.86.030(1)(g) (2019).
207. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 18.86.060(1)(a)–(b), (d) (2019).
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. . . [and]
(d) [n]ot to disclose any confidential information from or about the
buyer, except under subpoena or court order, even after termination
of the agency relationship[.]208

However, when a broker is acting as a dual agent, the relevant duties
are as follows:
(a) [t]o take no action that is adverse or detrimental to either party’s
interest in a transaction;
(b) [t]o timely disclose to both parties any conflicts of interest;
. . . [and]
(d) [n]ot to disclose any confidential information from or about either
party, except under subpoena or court order, even after termination
of the agency relationship.209

Notably, the “loyalty” framing that is present in the buyer or tenant’s
agent duties is not present in the dual agent’s duties.
Although The Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 establishes
duties brokers owe to principals, superseding the common law, it does not
provide any causes of action for breach of those duties. As such, “common
law tort causes of action remain the vehicle through which a party may
recover for a breach of statutory duties set forth in chapter 18.86 RCW.”210
Even though the legislature amended Revised Code of Washington section
18.86 in 2013, one year after Jackowski v. Borchelt, stating that a broker’s
duties are statutory only and that the common law relating to the duties
was entirely superseded, Jackowski is likely still applicable in this respect
because the statute only supersedes the fiduciary duties, not the common
law entirely.211
Thus, the statutory scheme supplies the duty underlying common law
torts claims such as fraud and negligent misrepresentation. However, these
common law torts are limited by the scope of the duty supplied in the
statute. For example, a claim of negligent misrepresentation flowing from
the breach of a broker’s duty can be made, but the claim is limited by the
statute providing the broker owes no duty “to independently verify the

208. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.86.050(1) (2019).
209. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 18.86.060(2)(a)–(b), (d) (2019).
210. Jackowski v. Borchelt, 278 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Wash. 2012).
211. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.86.110 (2019) (“The common law continues to apply to the parties
in all other respects.”).
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accuracy or completeness of any statement made . . . by any source
reasonably believed by the broker to be reliable.”212
J. Fraud
A claim for common law fraud can be made in Washington upon
showing all nine elements by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.
These are as follows: (1) “a representation of an existing fact”; (2) “its
materiality”; (3) “its falsity”; (4) “the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity”;
(5) “[the speaker’s] intent that it shall be acted upon by the person to whom
it is made”; (6) “ignorance of its falsity on the part of the person to whom
it is addressed”; (7) “the latter’s reliance on the truth of the
representation”; (8) “his [or her] right to rely upon it”; (9) “and his [or her]
consequent damage.”213 The duty not to commit fraud is not a fiduciary
duty and thus is not superseded by statute in Washington. Fraud requires
a showing that the speaker knew the statement was false, which can be
difficult to prove if there is no physical evidence showing the speaker’s
knowledge or when a motion to dismiss is granted before discovery allows
the uncovering of information that would show knowledge.
K. Constructive Fraud
Prior to Washington’s codification of broker duties in statute, a
doctrine of constructive fraud existed where a failure to disclose a broker’s
interest, or a kinship relationship between the broker and the property
owner, amounted to constructive fraud.214 This doctrine has not been cited
with respect to a real estate broker in a Washington since the enactment of
Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 in 1996, but no case law has
stated that the doctrine has been superseded by statute. Given that brokers
still have a duty to disclose conflicts of interest under Revised Code of
Washington section 18.86, it is possible that such a claim for constructive
fraud still exists despite the statute superseding common law duties;
however, there remains uncertainty as to whether it would be seen as a
valid claim.

212. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.86.030(2) (2019); See Bloor v. Fritz, 180 P.3d 805, 815 (Wash.
2008) (holding a broker’s exemption from verifying the accuracy of statements does not apply when
the broker has actual knowledge).
213. Beckendorf v. Beckendorf, 457 P.2d 603, 606–07 (Wash. 1969); WASH. PATTERN JURY
INSTR. CIV. WPI 160.01 (6A WASH. PRAC. 2019).
214. Mersky v. Multiple Listing Bureau, 437 P.2d 897, 901 (Wash. 1968).
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L. Fraudulent Concealment
A failure to disclose a material fact constitutes fraudulent
concealment when the individual had a duty to disclose the fact.215
Although claims of fraudulent concealment are most commonly analyzed
from the standpoint of the seller or landlord, real estate brokers are also
subject to fraudulent concealment claims when they had independent
knowledge of the defect.216 This tort is also equally applicable to
commercial properties.217 The duty to disclose information arises when (1)
the property has a concealed defect; (2) the seller, landlord, or agent has
knowledge of the defect; “(3) the defect presents a danger to the property,
health, or life of the purchaser; (4) the defect is unknown to the purchaser;
and (5) the defect would not be disclosed by a careful, reasonable
inspection by the purchaser.”218 Fraudulent concealment, similar to fraud,
requires a showing of knowledge on the part of the seller. Also, the
requirement that the defect would not be disclosed by careful, reasonable
inspection can be a barrier for some claims when, in hindsight, a more
thorough inspection should have been done.
M. Negligent Misrepresentation
Two types of negligent misrepresentation exist in Washington tort
case law, an affirmative misstatement and a failure to disclose. The two
often share the same label of negligent misrepresentation in case law,
despite the two claims possessing different elements. The tort of negligent
misrepresentation has been applied to commercial brokers in
Washington.219
N. Negligent Affirmative Misstatements
An affirmative misstatement requires showing that (1) the broker
supplied information to guide the principal that was false, (2) the broker
knew or should have known that the information was supplied to guide the
business transaction, (3) the broker was negligent in obtaining or
communicating the false information, (4) the principal relied on the false
information, (5) the reliance was reasonable, and (6) the false information
proximately caused damages to the principal.220 However, as noted above,
215. Bullinger v. Lilla, No. 68446-9-I, 2014 WL 1286328, at *9 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2014)
(citing Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672, 674 (Wash. 1960)).
216. See Svendsen v. Stock, 23 P.3d 455, 460–61 (Wash. 2001).
217. Shu-Chin Wang v. Kidder, Mathews & Segner, Inc., No. 62034-7-I, 2010 WL 3311866, at
*1 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2010).
218. Alejandre v. Bull, 153 P.3d 864, 872 (Wash. 2007).
219. See Key Dev. Inv., LLC v. Port of Tacoma, 292 P.3d 833, 835 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
220. WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTR. CIV. WPI 165.01 (6A WASH. PRAC. 2019).
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brokers are exempt from verifying the accuracy of information obtained
from sources they deem trustworthy.
O. Negligent failure to disclose
To establish negligent misrepresentation under a failure to disclose
theory, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the broker had a duty to disclose
information, (2) such information was not disclosed, (3) the broker was
negligent in failing to disclose such information, (4) had the information
been disclosed, the principal would have acted differently, and (5) the
principal was damaged by the failure to disclose the information.221
P. Washington Consumer Protection Act
A principal must establish five elements to prevail on a claim against
a broker or firm under Washington’s Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The
principal must establish: an “(1) unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2)
occurring in trade or commerce, (3) public interest impact, (4) injury to
plaintiff in his or her business or property, and (5) causation.”222
For the first element, the deceptive act or practice must have the
capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public.223 The act cannot be
an isolated incident affecting an individual but rather must have the
potential to deceive others. However, this element can be met by a broker
or firm marketing or showing a property while engaging in the deceptive
behavior.224
The third element, the public interest impact, requires showing a
likelihood that additional plaintiffs have been or will be injured in the same
manner. A factor test has been established for this element, with no single
factor being necessary or most important. The factors are as follows: “(1)
whether the acts were committed in the course of defendant’s business, (2)
whether the defendants advertised to the public, (3) whether the defendant
actively solicited the plaintiff, and (4) whether the parties occupied
unequal bargaining positions.”225 This factor test may be particularly
difficult to meet in a commercial setting because, even if a dual agent is
involved, parties may often be deemed more sophisticated and have equal
bargaining positions, though many commercial tenants are not as
sophisticated as commonly misconceived to be.
221. Bloor v. Fritz, 180 P.3d 805, 815 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008); see also WASH. PATTERN JURY
INSTR. CIV. WPI 165.01 (6A WASH. PRAC. 2019).
222. Bloor, 180 P.3d at 815 (citing Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins.
Co., 719 P.2d 531, 532 (Wash. 1986)).
223. Id.
224. See id. at 816 (holding that “[l]isting and showing the property without disclosing its
history” met the first element of a CPA claim).
225. Id. at 736–37 (citing Svendsen v. Stock, 23 P.3d 455 (Wash. 2001)).
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Another potential theory that can satisfy the requirements of the CPA
is fraud on the market, as introduced by the dissent in Sing v. John L.
Scott.226 However, this theory has not been adopted by Washington case
law nor analyzed after the 2013 amendment to the broker liability statute.
Under this theory, the unfair or deceptive practice is the misappropriation
of the principal’s confidential information for the agent’s distinct
advantage.227 Self-dealing can constitute fraud on the market if the selfdealing uses confidential information for the agent or firm’s distinct
advantage.228
Regardless of the claim, the principal must prove damages, which
can be especially difficult in a commercial leasing context. The most likely
harm that could result from a dual agency representation in a commercial
leasing context is not getting the best deal possible; however, proving that
a better deal would have resulted is incredibly difficult, especially when
the landlord could simply testify that the deal the tenant received was the
best the landlord would have agreed to. However, when damages can be
quantified, a tenant could recover for breach of broker duties in tort or
under the CPA.
PART IV
Part I provided the context and market realities relevant to the issue
of conflicts of interest in commercial brokerage under Washington law,
focusing on Greater Seattle. Part II examined the Law of Principal and
Agent impacting commercial brokerage, as well as the statutes’ legislative
history of the statute that supplants the common law with a statutory
licensing regime. Part III explored the common law of Principal and Agent
as applied in relevant Washington real estate transactions, including an
exposition of relevant case law, addressing various conflicts of interests
prohibited under Revised Code of Washington section 18.86, and
reviewed potential remedies for violations of those prohibitions. Finally,
in Part IV the Article examines the emerging trend of brokers being
principals or fiduciary managers for properties they broker, fundamentally
changing the nature of their conflicts of interest, and addressing the legal
implications of a broker being an undisclosed principal in a transaction
they broker after Revised Code of Washington section 18.86, and
concludes with the importance of a return to the status quo: reinstating
common law fiduciary duties in commercial real estate transactions for the
benefit and protection of all commercial tenants and to ensure the integrity
of the market and of all future commercial real estate transactions.
226. Sing v. John L. Scott, Inc., 948 P.2d 816, 826 (Wash. 1997) (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
227. Id.
228. See id.
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A. CRES Firms Have Increasingly Become Principals in the
Transactions They Broker in Washington
Large CRES firms are increasingly taking ownership interests in
commercial real estate or managing investment funds creating fiduciary
management roles for the firm as to commercial real estate. These
ownership interests and fiduciary relationships typically arise from a
purchase or acquisition of a property, management of the investments of
others, and from sponsoring investment opportunities where a firm invests
its funds alongside the funds of its investors. This sponsorship also takes
place in the development context where a firm developing a property will
partner with an investor by contributing its own funds to the project.
As firms expand their commercial development businesses and their
investment management businesses, the likelihood that a firm will be a
principal in a transaction they broker, either through an ownership interest
or as a fiduciary, will continue to increase. This is also true for dual agency
situations where the firm could represent both parties and have an
ownership interest or be a fiduciary manager of the property.
The firms engaged in this practice tend to have separate ownership
structures for the real estate and investment arms. Often the firm owning
the real estate or managing the funds will be a wholly owned subsidiary of
the CRES firm. When firms comingle assets with investors, further
companies may be created to hold such property. This separation can make
it difficult to identify exactly how prevalent and how frequently firms are
principals in the transactions they broker.
Firms vary on the amount of separation between the CRES firm and
the subsidiary managing investments or developing property. For
example, JLL’s investment management subsidiary, LaSalle, indicates
that JLL may “from time to time . . . provide services to assets in LaSalle
funds in the ordinary course of business.”229 Similarly, CBRE’s
investment management subsidiary, CBRE Global Investors, has a policy
of putting its clients above those of CBRE and CBRE must compete with
other service providers.230 Additionally, CBRE states that it “does not
engage in favoritism for the benefit of its Subsidiary.”231 However,
CBRE’s development arm, Trammell Crow, receives a discount on CBRE

229. JLL, THINKING BEYOND: 2017 ANNUAL REPORT: JONES LANG LASALLE INCORPORATED
11 (2017) [hereinafter JLL, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT], https://s22.q4cdn.com/446208711/files/
doc_financials/annual/JLL-2017-Annual-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HT38-MFTT].
230. CBRE GROUP, INC., MANAGING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 7 n.4 (2015) (on file with the
Seattle University Law Review).
231. Id. at 7 n.3.
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brokerage services,232 ensuring that CBRE will more likely be chosen over
other competitors to represent Trammell Crow.
The practice of a CRES firm having an ownership interest or
fiduciary management relationship with a property it is brokering has
continued to become more prevalent since the 2014 Conflicts of Interest
Research Report was published. CBRE currently has approximately 5
billion square feet of space under management.233 This square footage is
nearly three times higher than it was in 2013.234 And Hughes Marino
estimates CBRE either owns or is a fiduciary manager of 2.5 billion square
feet of commercial space.235 Put in perspective, the western half of the
United States only has about 2.4 billion square feet of office space.236 This
value, in part, reflects the $107 billion in assets CBRE Global Investors
has under management.237 To its credit, CBRE does have a policy to
disclose such conflicts and obtains consent when it or a subsidiary “owns”
the property, though it does not define what constitutes “ownership” and
it is not clear that a sponsored investment fund or a subsidiary comingling
funds and creating a separate entity would constitute ownership under
CBRE’s definition. It is also unclear what procedures and protocols CBRE
has in place to self-monitor whether it is meeting the intent and letter of
this policy, such that it is possible the policy is intended primarily to put
investors at ease about how the company is addressing conflicts of interest
as a Risk Factor in its SEC reporting documents.238
JLL has similarly continued to increase its presence as a fiduciary
manager of real estate assets. LaSalle, JLL’s investment arm, currently has
$60.1 billion in assets under management,239 of which $376.2 million are

232. Id. at 7 n.5.
233. CBRE Group, Inc. Ranked #207 on the Fortune 500, CBRE (May 21, 2018), https://www.
cbre.com/about/media-center/cbre-ranked-207-on-the-fortune-500 [https://perma.cc/T8TZ-FL8V].
234. CBRE GROUP, INC., ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at 6 (2013), http://www.annualreports.com
/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/c/NYSE_CBG_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU8F-DKCD] (“As
of December 31, 2013, we managed approximately 1.7 billion square feet of commercial space for
property owners and occupiers in the Americas, which we believe represents one of the largest
portfolios in the region.”).
235. Hughes Marino Settles Lawsuit with CBRE, THE REGISTRY: PUGET SOUND REAL ESTATE
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://news.theregistryps.com/hughes-marino-settles-lawsuit-with-cbre/ [https://
perma.cc/32KX-QMVQ].
236. Id.
237. About Us, CBRE GLOBAL INVESTORS, https://www.cbreglobalinvestors.com/company-2/
[https://perma.cc/46ZA-EAPG].
238. CBRE GROUP, INC., MANAGING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (2015) (on file with the Seattle
University Law Review).
239. LASALLE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, https://www.lasalle.com/ [https://perma.cc/JN3VQLXR].

216

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:169

LaSalle’s own funds.240 In 2013, LaSalle only had $47.6 billion in assets
under management.241
This practice is not limited to CBRE and JLL. Instead, Newmark
Knight Frank and Colliers International have moved in this direction as
well. Newmark Knight Frank owns a controlling interest in Newmark
Holdings, which was recently renamed GFP Real Estate.242 GFP Real
Estate is one of the largest holders of real estate in New York.243 Similarly,
Colliers International recently acquired Harrison Street, an investment
management firm.244
These increasing incidents of ownership and fiduciary responsibility
also appear in the development services full-service CRES firms may
offer. For example, CBRE’s development arm and real estate investment
arm is a wholly owned subsidiary called Trammell Crow. Trammell Crow
develops properties for others. In addition, it will sometimes partner with
investors and clients by contributing its own funds for projects, while
purchasing and developing property for profit on occasion with only its
own funds.245 An example of this is Trammell Crow’s recent purchase of
a development site in Washington, D.C. for $12 million.246
CBRE and Trammell Crow were recently the subject of a lawsuit
where CBRE represented both Trammell Crow, the owner of the property,
and the government seeking to lease the property.247 In this case, CBRE
properly disclosed both the dual agency and the ownership conflict to the
government, and the government consented to the representation
continuing upon finding that the organizational conflict of interest had
been mitigated.248 Although the court found the appellant failed to show
that an unmitigated organizational conflict of interest existed with respect
240. JLL, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 229, at 12.
241. JLL, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT (2014), https://s22.q4cdn.com/446208711/files/doc_
financials/annual/JLL-2014-Annual-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/N77R-56TK].
242. GFP Real Estate, Newmark Holdings Becomes GFP Real Estate, CISION: PR NEWSWIRE
(Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/newmark-holdings-becomes-gfp-realestate-300529743.html [https://perma.cc/77ER-QHJ7].
243. Id.
244. Colliers International to Make Transformational Strategic Investment in Harrison Street
Real Estate, COLLIERS INT’L (May 14, 2018), https://corporate.colliers.com/Newsroom/ColliersInternational-to-make-transformational-strategic-investment-in-Harrison-Street-Real-Estate
[https://perma.cc/ZFQ5-HXSF].
245. CBRE, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2017), http://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/
AnnualReportArchive/c/NYSE_CBRE_2017_59b5118388204899b7214d0b24290f76.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FR64-AMZJ].
246. Jon Banister, Trammell Crow Buys Brookland Development Site For $12M, BISNOW (June
26, 2018), https://www.bisnow.com/washington-dc/news/land/trammell-crow-buys-brooklanddevelopment-site-for-12m-89997 [https://perma.cc/LN56-P7AG].
247. Parcel 49C Ltd. P’ship v. United States, 31 F.3d 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
248. Id. at 124.
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to Trammell Crow and CBRE,249 this case represents how increasingly
common it is for a large CRES firm to have an ownership interest or a
fiduciary management relationship with a property it is acting as a dual
broker for.
B. The Legal Implications of a Broker as an Undisclosed Principal in a
Commercial Real Estate Transaction
Reiterating from the Abstract, Washington common law principles
of the Law of Principal and Agent are instructive here. The problems
associated with dual agency have become more acute and more pervasive
in the world of commercial real estate generally, and in commercial
leasing transactions in particular. Under the common law, an agent would
owe the following duties to its principal:
 Unbroken service and loyalty (the “duty of undivided loyalty”);
 Confidentiality;
 Full disclosure of information necessary for the principal to
make well-informed decisions;
 Acting in the best interest of the principal;
 Reasonable care and diligence; and
 Accountability to the principal.
It seems beyond peradventure that a commercial real estate
professional holding herself out as a tenant’s representative of an agent
serving a tenant as principal, who is, in fact, an undisclosed principal in
the transaction to which that agent has steered the principal, is in direct
violation of more than half of the above common law duties an agent owes
to its principal. In fact, other than the duty of confidentiality, in discharge
of which the agent must maintain the confidentiality of the principal’s
information, the actions of the agent serving its own interests appears to
violate the five remaining common law duties: undivided loyalty; full
disclosure; acting in the principal’s best interests; reasonable care and
diligence, and accountability to the principal. Justice Talmadge’s
dissenting opinion in Sing, cited above in Part II, made clear how an agent
breaches their common law duties to its principal when that agent acts in
its own selfish interests, and not in the interests of the agent’s principal.
Referring to the extensive hypothetical scenarios presented in the
2014 Conflicts of Interest study, it is hard to fathom how full disclosure of
an agent’s conflicts of interest and securing the principal’s advance,
informed written consent serves to actually protect the principal’s best
interests. Moreover, and perhaps more to the point, a principal’s advance
249. Id. at 123–24.
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written consent to accept a dual agency representation constitutes a waiver
of the principal’s enforcement rights under other recovery theories, such
as in tort, as described above, under a theory similar to that of contributory
negligence.
It seems a principal’s waiver of such fundamental rights as those
owed by an agent to its principal is an intentionally self-destructive act to
that principal’s best interests, tantamount to a statement by the principal
that “I am aware I am entering into a relationship in which my agent owes
me no fiduciary duties whatsoever and accept, in advance, any
consequences adverse to my interests that follow from this flawed
relationship.” Perhaps if the necessary written waiver was cast in such
stark terms, more principals would better comprehend the potential,
inevitably adverse consequences of accepting a dual agency relationship,
and refuse to consent as a consequence.
Further, when an agent acts in its own interests in a transaction in
which it owes fiduciary duties to its principal in that transaction, the broker
is held to an imputed knowledge standard, and is also held to higher
standards of conduct than the standard fiduciary duties an agent owes to a
principal at common law.250 Although this imputed knowledge standard
was altered by Revised Code of Washington section 18.86.100, the statute
merely limits a broker’s imputed knowledge of facts known by a sub-agent
to those actually known by the broker and does not change imputed
knowledge for managing and supervising brokers.251 This was the fact
pattern in the Sing case, where three agents, all working under the same
brokerage firm that also served as the listing broker for the seller, with one
agent acting as the agent for a prospective buyer and another acting solely
in the interest of herself and her husband.252 Although the majority opinion
largely disregarded the conflict of interests present in the facts, Judge
Talmadge’s dissenting opinion addressed this aspect of the facts in far
greater detail with a scathing analysis of the “self-dealing” of the agent
who used her access to otherwise confidential information regarding an
extant counteroffer from the aggrieved, prospective purchaser to gain an
advantage in making a competing offer for the same property on terms the
self-dealing agent knew would be attractive to the sellers.253
Relying on Mersky, Justice Talmadge stated, in pertinent part, that
[F]rom this agency relationship [between a property owner seeking
to list and sell its property and a listing broker,] springs the duty and
the obligation upon the part of the listing broker, as well as on the
250. Sing v. John L. Scott, Inc., 948 P.2d 816, 826 (Wash. 1997) (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
251. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.86.100(2) (2019).
252. Sing, 948 P.2d at 819–20.
253. Id. at 825–28 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
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part of his subagents, to exercise the utmost good faith and fidelity
toward his principal, the seller, in all matters falling within the scope
of his employment. . . . [And] there flows from this agency
relationship and its accompanying obligation of utmost fidelity and
good faith, the legal, ethical, and moral responsibility on the part of
the listing broker, as well as his subagents, to exercise reasonable
care, skill, and judgment . . . ; to scrupulously avoid representing any
interest antagonistic to that of the principal in transactions involving
the principal’s listed property, or otherwise self-dealing with that
property, without the explicit and fully informed consent of the
principal . . . .254

Justice Talmadge’s dissenting opinion went on to note, by way of
excerpt from the Cantwell decision:
The law exacts of every agent the utmost fidelity to his principal. He
must keep him fully informed as to all his transactions, and the state
of the business or interests entrusted to him. Any departure from these
rules is a fraud in law. An agent to sell cannot become the purchaser,
and an agent to buy cannot be himself the seller. Equity removes
from the trustee every temptation to violate his trust by declaring in
advance that all such transactions are null and void at the option of
the principal[.]255

If a tenant representative in the employ, and working under the
brokerage license, of a large, full-service CRES firm shows his
prospective tenant client a commercial space in which that brokerage firm
has a direct or indirect ownership interest, and makes no disclosures
whatsoever to that tenant client regarding such ownership conflict of
interest, the brokerage firm, if not the tenant representative himself, would
benefit economically from the negotiation and execution of a lease of the
premises through that tenant representative. Under these facts, it seems
clear that an actionable conflict of interest claim under the common law
principles of principal and agent should exist, especially given the specific
prohibitions enunciated in Justice Talmadge’s dissenting opinion.
Yet by superseding the common law of agency and its attendant
fiduciary duties, the Washington Legislature has made it far more difficult
to remedy an undisclosed conflict of interest. Certainly, Revised Code of
Washington section 18.86 created a statutory duty requiring disclosure of
conflicts, but it did not provide any remedies. Instead, injured tenants must
rely on theories of tort and the CPA for relief, each type of claim with its
own distinct challenges and hurdles, as discussed above.
254. Id. at 822–23 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citing Mersky v. Multiple Listing
Bureau, 437 P.2d 897, 899 (Wash. 1968)).
255. Id. at 823 (emphasis added) (citing Cantwell v. Nunn, 88 P. 1023, 1025 (Wash. 1907)).
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This conflict of interest exists in an environment where commercial
tenants may not be especially sophisticated and be able to understand the
ramifications of dual agency and the attendant conflicts.256 Rather it is a
common misconception that commercial tenants are sophisticated, a point
that was emphasized during California’s discussion of Senate Bill 1171 in
2014:
There is a common misconception that parties involved in
commercial real estate transactions are (1) sophisticated; (2) of equal
bargaining power; or (3) equally knowledgeable and experienced in
real estate as the other party or the brokers involved. This is not
always the case. For example, a small business owner whose only
real estate transaction over the next five years will be his/her office
lease is not going to be as sophisticated as a landlord whose primary
business is real estate and who is negotiating multiple leases a year
with the help of a team of sophisticated professionals. That business
owner is at a severe disadvantage at the bargaining table and should
be educated on the duties or limited duties the licensed real estate
professionals involved in the transaction owe to all parties.257

Given this potential significant lack of sophistication, commercial
tenants are severely underserved by the current tort and CPA claims
offered in Washington law. Compare these, often difficult to pursue,
claims with the previous standard discussed in Merksy where such an
undisclosed conflict would amount to fraud in law, with no requirement to
show knowledge or intent. Even though there are many statutory parallels
between a broker’s common law duties “to conduct [oneself] in a way free
of bad faith, dishonesty, or untrustworthiness,”258 enforcement of these
duties has been made much more difficult.
It is clear that Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 eroded
protections tenants previously enjoyed under the common law. With the
difficulties of pursuing claims under the CPA or in tort, tenants can only
be fully protected by prohibiting the practice of dual agency in commercial
real estate transactions in Washington. And, tenants can only fully be
protected by reinstating to its full extent the common law of agency in
these transactions.
CONCLUSION
In retrospect, and after examining carefully in this Article the
common law duties an agent owes its principal, and the legislative history
256. See generally SMIRNIOTOPOULOS, 2014 COI STUDY REPORT, supra note 1.
257. S. 1171, 2013–14 Leg. Sess., Senate Floor Analysis 5–6 (Cal. 2014).
258. Sing, 948 P.2d at 824 (emphasis added).
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and subsequent interpretation by the courts of Revised Code of
Washington section 18.86, it is incomprehensible why the Washington
State Legislature enacted a licensure scheme to regulate commercial real
estate brokers and, in the process, supplanted the well-established and
long-standing common law duties agents owe their principals, thereby
substantially weakening the protections principals, such as prospective
tenants, previously had against various forms of harmful conduct by
commercial property brokers. The legislature repeatedly, following the
initial enactment of HB 1659 in 1996, amended the statutory provisions of
Revised Code of Washington section 18.86, further weakening the already
limited statutory protections. Those subsequent amendments, offered
under the pretext of providing needed “clarifications” of the original
language, rendered the entire scheme almost meaningless in the context of
dual agency; marginalizing and, to some extent, completely undermining
the duties a tenant representative owes to a prospective tenant of
commercial space. These changes raise a number of questions about the
true motivations underpinning their substance and timing; more than a
mere inference of favoring the commercial brokerage industry generally,
and full-service CRES firms in particular, may be drawn from the legal
research and analysis presented in this Article.
The damage done—leaving aggrieved tenants without adequate
recourse against unscrupulous and self-serving practices through dual
agency by full-service CRES firms, as perpetrated by their tenant
representatives—may still be reversed, at least for prospective participants
in these transactions. The best—and only adequate—way to fully and
properly protect commercial tenants from unfair advantages enjoyed by
landlords through their commercial brokers is to prohibit altogether the
practice of dual agency in commercial real estate transactions and restore
fully all of the protections previously afforded tenants under the common
law of principal and agent in the commercial real estate transaction
context. At the bare minimum, the practice of dual agency in commercial
real estate transactions must be stopped. Otherwise, we risk continuing to
subordinate the expectations and interests of commercial tenants in favor
of full-service CRES firms and their commercial landlord clients.

